Last updated by tymon on 2008-11-06. Originally submitted by rlew on 2007-04-03.
IFA Friday Lectures, Room 601A 6 PM
13 April
prof. Aleksander Szwedek: "Objectification" - a new theory of metaphor
Lakoff and Johnson 1980 treat structural, orientational and ontological metaphors as coequal, giving, it seems, structural metaphors certain priority. This is inconsistent with their experientialism position imposing a hierarchy in our sensory experience which has to be reflected in metaphor typology. In their 2003 edition they admit that their 1980 classification was inadequate, but do not take this new position to its logical conclusion. In the old and new approach they have to resort to "shared entailments" to explain "overlap of metaphors", relations among different types of metaphors.
My Objectification hypothesis claims, in consonance with our experience that ontological metaphors are primary, and structural and orientational metaphors derive from ontological metaphors. Structure and orientation do not exist without objects they are structure and orientation of. The structure and orientation are properties of objects - it is always the structure and orientation of an object and never the object of structure and orientation. Such an approach, formulated in the form of objectification (Szwedek 2000, 2002), is in consonance with Kotarbiński's reism, Langacker's distinction between things (objects) and relations (structure and orientation), and an analysis of the Great Chain of Being (describing the physical world only).
Objectification necessarily requires discussion of senses (sensory experience) among which touch is given special importance as the earliest sense to develop, the whole body sense, the closest sense to the SELF, the only sense that gives us the perception of density (the essence of the material world) and thus identification of objects, as well as three-dimensionality, and consequently boundaries, weight, etc.
In objectification 'shared entailments' and 'overlap of metaphors' is replaced by a simpler and natural process of inheritance of properties. Once an abstract concept is objectified, it inherits from material objects elements of their structure, orientation, and some properties. E.G. once thought (an identified fragment of the process of thinking) is treated as a material object, it inherits from real material objects such features as objecthood (scatter, gather, collect, give; abandon, suspend), weight (weighty, light), colour (dark), animacy (sober, striking, a thought crossed my mind; birth of thought), container (deep, in thoughts), countability (many thoughts, first thought, second thought, last thought).
Thus Objectification postulates a hierarchy of metaphor types, with ontological being primary, and structural and orientational derivative, in perfect consonance with our experience of the physical world. Consequently Lakoff and Johnson's shared entailments are replaced by a natural and simpler inheritance of properties.
The argumentation leads to a major conclusion that our metaphysical worlds have been created iconically to the physical world of objects.
mgr Karolina Krawczak: (Inter)subjectification and objectification revisited
The paper discusses the interrelated processes of subjectification, objectification and intersubjectification along with their dynamic results. They are here understood as the conceptual consequences of the vantage point selected, largely unconsciously, by the human subject seeking to make sense of the phenomenal world. Two major approaches to the issue under consideration are juxtaposed - one proposed by Traugott, the other by Langacker. The aim is to arrive at the points where these purportedly divergent lines of thought actually converge.
upcoming event: 25 May
dr Dagmara Krzyżaniak, mgr Katarzyna Kuczma
