The paper argues that names constitute a primary linguistic category: they do not constitute a sub-class of nouns. What have been regarded as formal devices for signalling “name-hood”, “properness”, and so on, are part of a language’s derivational morphology. In this context, it argues that apparent “changes of gender” of Old English nouns are the product of a type of derivational (word-class changing) morphology.

1. Introduction

This paper is concerned with the categoriality of names. It argues that names constitute a linguistic category, and that what have been regarded as formal devices for signalling “name-hood” are part of a language’s derivational morphology. And it will include apparent “changes in gender” of Old English nouns as resulting from a type of derivational morphology.

By categoriality, I mean word-class status, specifically in terms of the notional grammar of e.g. Anderson (1997, 2007) and Böhm (1998). “Major word classes” are primary syntactic categories. Fundamental to a notional grammar is
the assumption that the morpho-syntactic distribution of members of a primary category is not semantically arbitrary. Both position and morphological expression are manifestations of the semantically-based category of a word. Such distribution is therefore not “criterial” for word-class status: rather it can be understood only in terms of the semantic bases of the elements that constitute syntactic structures.

Crucially, it is the semantics of prototypical members of a category that determine the morpho-syntactic characteristics of that category. Prototypical verbs, as “doing words”, take arguments, for instance. Nouns, which prototypically denote stable entities, can function in the syntax as arguments (e.g., “subject”, “object”). The secondary categories which may be associated with primary ones also follow from the semantics of prototypical category members. So verbs are associated with the secondary category of tense (which allows an event denoted by the verb to be “timed”). Nouns are associated with classifying secondary categories such as gender, and with cases which correlate with the argument-function of a noun. Distinctions within these secondary categories, such as “past”/“non-past”, or “masculine”/“feminine”/“neuter”, are secondary features: features of secondary categories. Association of certain secondary categories with names will contribute to their categorial classification §§4.3., 4.4., and to the account of gender change as derivational morphology in §5 below.

2. Name and noun

An assumption has prevailed, and continues to do so, that names belong to the same category as nouns, echoing the tradition familiar to many that “a noun is the name of a person, place, or thing”. By this traditional categorial definition, the name Peter, the name Rome, the name house all belong to the word-class (category) “noun” (all nouns are “names”, and all “names” are nouns). Within this category are then distinguished “proper” names (personal and place) and “common” names. These terms, as well as “proper” noun vs. “common” noun embody the theoretical claim just stated: that a name is a noun. Gary-Prieur (1994: 243), for instance, invokes “la grammaire traditionnelle, qui présente N[om][propre] et N[om][commun] comme deux catégories lexicales subdissimulant celle du nom”. Anderson (2007: §§1.2, 6.2.2) offers a representative survey of works embodying such an assumption.

I have the impression that those of us who regard ourselves in some sense as “onomasts” have been beguiled by this prevalent assumption into focussing attention on a limited part of the grammar of a language, in attempts to distinguish “proper” from “common” names/nouns. This is given explicit and implicit attention in, for instance, many papers from The 21st International Congress of Onomastic Sciences (e.g., Akselberg 2005; Bolotov 2005; Brendler 2005;
Names, derivational morphology, and Old English gender

Sklyarenko – Sklyarenko 2005; Van Langendonck 2005, and others whose sub-
stance I will be discussing subsequently). Nübling (2005) specifically groups
“Eigennamen” and “Appellativen” as members of a single class of substantives.
And yet, as Nübling (2005) puts it, there is an “immens” difference between
these two putative subclasses: “Eigennamen” (“proper” names) function as
monoreferential. This is a notional characterisation of “Eigennamen”, which
might alert us to the possibility of a categorial difference between these and
“Appellativen”, a possibility I pursue in §4 below.

In languages whose primary source of “proper” name-formation is drawn
from common words (§3 below), the former may remain homophonous with its
base word, creating, in Nübling’s view, potential obstacles to daily communica-
tion. “Eigennamen” therefore face a “Dilemma”: “Eigennamen müssen sich
zwar synchron streng von Appellativen unterscheiden, speisen sich aber dia-
chron aus diesen” (Nübling 2005: 249); and they may acquire formal distinct-
iveness from the base word, by means of what Nübling (2005) refers to as “pro-
prialer Markierung”. I wonder, however, whether the “Dilemma” is one faced
by classifying linguists/onomasts, rather than by language users, who cope with
homophones between various word-classes. If we stand back a bit from a two-
way distinction between so-called sub-classes of substantives, and view a lan-
guage as a system (to recall, unnecessarily, Saussure 1962 here), and “proper”
names within such a system as a whole, and not just their relationship to “appel-
latives”, it can be argued that any danger to daily communication posed by
“proper” names homonymous with “appellatives” is no greater than that posed
by homonyms between words of any category.

To repeat (§1 above), the notional characterisation of a word class deter-
mines its distribution: its general morpho-syntactic behaviour, which the
speaker and hearer know how to exploit. The monoreferentiality of names, aptly
invoked by Nübling, is a notional characteristic of “proper” names, which
determines the sorts of formal characteristics as cited by Nübling (2005: 250),
which distinguish for the hearer which category is involved. Thus, distributional
behaviour distinguishes the “proper name” in Sie geht ... nach Neustadt from
the “appellative” in Sie geht in die Neustadt: compare English She is going to
Newcastle and She is going to the new castle (I return to the presence or absence
of an article in English, and the (non-)significance of capital letters in §4.1.
below). And Nübling acknowledges that contextual factors also help to distin-
guish names, just as other word classes may be so distinguished. But, of course,
formal distinctions may also be made between a derived word and its base, by
means of derivational morphology.

I argue that names are categorial: that they form a class distinct from com-
mon words; that Nübling’s “immens” difference is one of primary (major word-
class) category; and that types of “proprialer Markierung” are expressions of
derivational morphology. They express the derivation of a name from a common word, just as derivational morphology may express the derivation of, say, a verb from a noun, or an adverb from an adjective. But this is to pre-empt. I will first illustrate something of what might be called “name-marking”: formal differentiation of names from other words.

3. So-called “proprialer Markierung” exemplified

Szczepaniak-Mendez (2005) and Nübling (2005), both deal with onomastic systems in which names systematically have a source in common words, and both discuss formal means by which a name may be distinguished from its (originally homophonous) source. I say “systematically”, because there is a sense in which all names can be shown to be “related” to common words. Sweet’s (1891: 58) familiar distinction within names, whether personal or place-names, of “two well-defined classes, according as they are connected or unconnected with common words in the same language”, is illustrated by New English examples as follows. “Connected” names are ones identical in form to current common words or phrases: Christian names such as Patience, Violet, surnames such as Brown, Smith, and place names such as Newcastle, The Strand (whether or not the city of Newcastle in New South Wales has a “new castle” would not impinge on the connectedness of the name itself, according to Sweet’s criteria). “Connected” names, in Sweet’s sense, have been converted from common words. “Unconnected” names, such as Philip, John, London, Thames, are nevertheless seen to be in origin “connected”:

that is to say, that all proper names have arisen from limiting the application of some common word to one particular object. Just as the first man who was called Brown was so called because of his brown hair or brown complexion, so also the first man who was called Philip was so called because of his love of horses or skill in driving or riding; for in Greek – the language in which this name was first formed – it was originally an adjective (philippos) meaning ‘fond of horses’ (Sweet 1891: 58).

Discussing the “etymological meaning” of names, Lyons (1997: 221-222), too, suggests that we will usually find the same kind of origin for “institutionalized names of persons and places in various languages” as for those “taken from the ordinary vocabulary of a language and … assigned by virtue of the meaning of the expressions in question”, or, in Lyons’ terms, “synchronically motivated” at a particular time. Thus, John, for example, “comes, through Greek and Latin, from a Hebrew name, which could be interpreted in terms of the ordinary vocabulary of Hebrew as ‘God has been gracious’. The “etymological meaning” of such a name, then is described as “diachronically discoverable”.
Pulgram’s (1954: 18-19) research into names in Indo-European and non-Indo-European languages leads him to remark:

I have found no names which ultimately and basically are not part of the current or past lexicon of a language. Names made up of nonsense syllables or a random sequence of sounds (like that of the French linguist Bréal, who allegedly pulled five letters out of a hat containing the alphabet and made his name therefrom, or like the fabricated pseudonyms of artist and actors, or of a single letter (like the s in Harry S. Truman) are rare and can be accounted for as exceptions and oddities [parentheses as in Pulgram].

This observation is echoed in Anderson (2007: 92): “most – perhaps all – naming traditions clearly originate in processes of naming based on common nouns or other categories, though often any such origin may be obscure”. Pulgram (1954: 46) reasserts that “there is at bottom of each name a dictionary value which, however unrecognizable or overgrown it may be today, at one time was obvious to the speakers”; and makes the further point that the awareness of “meaning” will vary from individual to individual. Thus, the “etymological meaning”, to borrow the phrase of Lyons quoted above, of John will be more transparent to some than to others.

The concern here, however, is with naming systems in which names are typically formed from, or based on, common words or phrases current in the language in question, at the time of the formation of the name. Systems I have in mind are exemplified by early Germanic personal names. In Old English, for instance, the monothematic name Brid is cognate with the common word brid ‘bird’, Man with man ‘man’, and dithematic names are based on elements cognate with two common words: e.g., Manwine, with elements, or themes, cognate with man and wine ‘friend’ respectively (details are readily available in, e.g., Clark 1992: §7.2.1; Colman 1984, 1988: §3, 1992: 25, 2004: 184). The Polish and German systems of family names illustrated below also draw on common words as bases. Present-day English personal naming does not consistently rely on common words as bases: names such as Patience, cited above, are sporadically chosen. And a name such as John, albeit susceptible to etymological interpretation, as above, was never based on an English common word: it is a borrowing of a non-Germanic name (along with its variant forms borrowed into other non-Hebraic languages). It is a loan word, rather than a word derived from another in the same language. My argument is, that names in origin cognate with common words in the same language are susceptible to derivational morphological signalling of their derivation.

Polish names are commonly distinguished by “onymische Suffixe”, as illustrated and discussed by Szczepaniak-Mendez (2005). So kowal ‘smith’ is homophonous with the family name Kowal, but the Polish ear prefers forms with explicit onymic suffixes, such as Kowalska, Kowalski, to give but two of the
author’s examples (Szczepaniak-Mendez 2005: 296). German family names, in a system which has been officially fixed since the seventeenth century, have developed a different “strategy” to distinguish them from common words. As the original common words on which the names were based become obsolete or confined to regional dialects, undergo lexical-semantic change, and so on, the names stagnate, while time divorces them from their common-word bases. German thus uses the difference between the synchronic words, the result of dissociation of the name from the common word, as “proprialer Markierung”. Thus, e.g., although partially transparent, the name Schmidt is “divorced” from the common word Schmied. Möller differentiated from the common word Müller, while Stratz, for instance, is classified as opaque (Nübling 2005: 254).

Redin (1919: xxiii) discussing ancient Greek hypocoristic names, shortened from compound, or dithematic, names, describes differences between such names and their related stem-words as follows. On names based on oxytone stem-words, the hypocoristic name may have the accent shifted to a preceding syllable: e.g., Γλαύκος, shortened from Γλαύκ-ιππος; compare the adjective γλαυκός. In other instances, “the short name reflects the composition form, which differs from the independent form of the stem word”: e.g., Νύμφος, shortened from Νυμφό-δωρος; compare the noun νύμφη. Here the accented syllable of the hypocoristic name coincides with that of the base common word, but the name retains the typical Greek compositional vowel [o]. Redin’s summary makes the specific claim that “[w]hen the short form would have coincided with the independent stem word, there is usually an alteration of the member, in order to prevent confusion with the identifying names”. On similar aspects of the structure of ancient Greek personal names, see further Morpurgo Davies (2000: 16-19). In addition to the shifted accent of Γλαύκ-ιππος, Morpugo Davies (2000: 17) cites the feminine Γλαυκίππη “in contrast with the standard derivational pattern” for related “two-termination” common word compounds: that is, those which do not distinguish between masculine and feminine. In such an instance, the feminine gender is specific to a name, not a common word.

In this light, I want to pursue the interpretation by Sandred (1997) of word-forms which, in Old English charters, do not conform to the historical gender of the noun, and to suggest that apparent “changes in gender” of Old English common words signal derivation of a name. In languages with grammatical gender, it has been observed that what is apparently a single “word” can occur in forms representing different genders. The possibility has been observed for words throughout the Old English period to show forms of declension classes of more than one gender: e.g., horh ‘rheum’ (masc., neut.), leah ‘lea’ (masc., fem.), sloh ‘mire’ (masc., fem., neut., declined as either a-stem or ó-stem: Campbell 1959: §§574.2, 589.3); see Lass (1995: 97). One interpretation of
such variation, of course, is as evidence that “grammatical gender is disappear-
ing”, as remarked by Sandred (1997: 322) of the arguments of Samuels (1972: 156). From his interpretation of the evidence of the toponymic vocabulary of charter boundaries, Kitson (1990: 185), however, argues that in Old English “gender was a dialectal variable”. So, for instance, “Hyll ‘(little) hill’ is masculine among the Hwicce and feminine among the West Saxons and Mercian Angles...” (Kitson 1990: 189). Historically, the noun *hyll* belongs to a masculine declension class (Campbell 1959: §578); for the West Saxons and Mercian Angles it was feminine – or had become so in the toponymic vocabulary.

It is significant that the “nouns of more than one gender”, discussed by Kitson (1990) belong to what he calls “topographic vocabulary”. Kitson implicitly regards these as “common nouns”. The findings of Sandred (1991, 1997) suggest otherwise. Sandred (1997: 320) “aims at drawing attention to an unexpected morphological feature found in one charter, Sawyer 1458, BCS 1097, which concerns land in Kent”, and which is dated not earlier than c. 964. The charter contains no boundary clause, but gives details of the history of four estates in Kent. Sandred specifically refers to the lexical items identifying the extents of the estates as names. Examples in point are the forms *<Earhīðes>* and *<Crægan>* in the following quotations (from Sandred 1997: 321):

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geuðe he him. Earhīðes. & Crægan. & Ēnesforðes. & Wuldaþames ...
geuðe Ēlfhe þam Eadrice. Earhīðes. & Crægan. & Wuldaþames
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Now OE *ēarhyð* is a feminine noun, “a compound of OE *ēar* ‘earth’ ... and OE *hyð* ‘landing place, harbour’, which is amply recorded as a fem. noun, a jō-stem, which is not known to have had any other gender in OE” (Sandred 1997: 321). The genitive form *<Earhīðes>*, governed by the verb *geunnan*, does not, of course, reflect feminine gender. As Sandred points out, we could suggest simple analogy with the masculine genitive forms *<Ēnesforðes>* and *<Wuldaþames>* “but that raises the question why the other fem. *Cræge* is correctly inflected in the gen. as one would expect”.

Interpreting notes made in the early 1940’s by E. Tengstrand, and given to Sandred in 1976, the latter suggests (1997: 322) that “when the charter was drawn up, the designation ēarthīð ‘gravel landing-place’ was no longer associated with the landing place which had given rise to the name but now stood for a large estate, a big piece of land or a settlement. Land, cultivation and settlement were often expressed by nouns which were masc. or neuter in OE...”. Quoting from Tengstrand, Sandred explains: “the original meaning was less and less often realized, the whole more and more isolated from its parts”. Thus, according to Sandred, both semantic and formal analogy operate in the instance of *<Earhīðes>* (although in notional terms, of course, the formal analogy follows from the se-
mantic); but the form Crægan, as the name of a river, and therefore feminine, retains the original gender of the noun. Sandred’s (1991) research into “anomalous” inflections, “the majority of which are found in boundary surveys”, leads him to conclude that a “change of inflection is no proof that the appellative itself has undergone a change of gender or has two genders”; rather, we are dealing with “a change of inflection connected with the use of the word in a new toponymic context” (Sandred 1997: 325, 323). This is compared with changes of inflection on names in Swedish, in which “a word [especially field-names FC] can adopt endings from the paradigm of a different gender, which it is not known to have when used as an appellative” (Sandred 1997: 324).

Now, it will become clear in §4.1. below, that I do not hold with the concept of a word being “used as” a word of another class. Rather, I argue that the formal expression of change of gender on words representing topographic items indicates that a word of one class has been derived from, or based on, another. In this instance, a “non-name” word has been turned into a name. So Kitson’s (1990) suggestion of “dialectal variable” need not be invalid: but what would be “variable” is whether or not this derivation of a name has occurred. Hyll cited above, for instance, may be a name for the West Saxons and Mercian Angles, but remains a common noun for the Hwicce. Alternatively, the forms may represent a name in all the dialects, but only some reflect its name status in the form of the word.

A perceived need to invoke “proprialer Markierung” as distinct from other derivational morphology is contingent on a theory that groups names and “appellatives”, or “proper” and “common” nouns, as the same category, or word class. What has to be “marked” is “properness”. But in a view of names as a category, what is “marked” is word-class: that is, “name”. And any overt signalling of name-status within a word-form, as illustrated above, has the same status of such signalling of class in the structure of a form of any word class. That is, it signals derivational morphology. “[P]roprialer Markierung”, then is “name-marking”; and one can just as well talk of “verb-marking” or “adverb-marking”.

4. On names as a grammatical category

4.1. More on the prevailing view of names as nouns

Names have been classified as forming a sub-set of the major word-class noun on the basis of criteria of intersubstitutability within syntactic structures (Lyons 1977: §11.1; Colman 1992: 12; see also, e.g., Morpurgo Davies 2002: 15). And this accords with the implication in Bloomfield (1933: 205), that names and “common” nouns share a category, the former distinguished, however, by his familiar morphosyntactic “criteria” insofar as, unlike nouns, they occur always
“without determiner”, and “only in the singular”; and these would correlate with
the further semantic observation that the “species of object contains only one
specimen” (correlating with Nübling’s “monoreferentiality”).

That the relevance of Bloomfieldian criteria is non-universal (in the sense of
not common to all languages), is remarked in Pulgram (1954: 42) and particu-
larly Anderson (2004): “[t]he extent to which there are overt markers of name-
hood varies from language to language, so that definitions of names involving
superficial formal properties … are inadequate”. This is illustrated in the latter
by reference to Mithun’s (1984: 40-41) observations on a language such as Mo-
hawk, “in which most nouns are not marked for plural and which lacks a cate-
gory of articles”. And while names in English lack a determiner, names in (non-
vocative) functions in Greek, occur with a gender-expressing (and for place-
names also number-expressing) article. I return below to names in English oc-
curring with a determiner, or expressing plural, as well as to supposed criterion
of intersubstitutability.

But Pulgram’s (1954: 42) purpose in rejecting “purely grammatical features”
as criteria is not for him to argue that names are not nouns. He claims, rather,
that the difference between “common and proper noun” is “not one of kind, but
of degree, of usage”. Pulgram (1954: 20) cites the ability of names to become
nouns as significant evidence in favour of “the original and continued oneness
of what we now call ‘noun’ and ‘name’”, further claimed to be supported by the
“ease with which noun and name are functionally interchangeable without pass-
ing, one should note, into another grammatical category” (Pulgram 1954: 24-
25). Perhaps over-familiar examples are sandwich and cardigan (name to
noun); Haymarket (compound noun to name). This echoes Jespersen (1924:
67): “the difference between the two classes is thus seen to be one of degree
only”, expressed more emphatically (Jespersen 1924: 69, 70-71) as follows.
“Linguistically it is utterly impossible to draw a sharp line of demarcation be-
tween proper names and common nouns. We have seen transition from the for-
er to the latter, but the opposite is equally frequent”; “no sharp line can be
drawn between proper and common names, the difference being one of degree
rather than one of kind”.

Lass (1995: 96), also, querying the wording of Colman (1992: 96) in claim-
ing that Old English personal names are “formed from elements cognate with
common words” concludes: “[r]ather than name-themes being ‘cognates’ (and
hence special items), they might be better construed as special uses of ordinary
words”. Van Langendonck (2005: 316), too, would seem to support the “func-
tionally interchangeable” interpretation of Pulgram, quoted above, by introd-
ucing the concept of “proprial lemmas” (or lexemes), which may have different
grammatical functions. John and Napoleon are both proprial lemmas, but in
John admires Napoleon each is a “proper name”, because it functions propri-

ally, but in another John (where the relevant form is accompanied by a determiner), the proprial lemma functions “as a common noun (appellative)”. For van Langendonck (2005: 319), the form John, in different semantic-syntactic contexts is a “polyreferential proprial” lemma. Note that in the case of appellatives we would speak of “polysemy”. In support of this invocation of polysemy is offered the claim that, for instance, “the English lexeme work can be used as a noun ..., or as a verb”. This specific invocation of the concept of polysemy provides a basis for calling into question the previously cited claims about words being “used as” one thing or another; and specifically, for arguing, as I do below, against polysemy itself.

Coates (2005) seeks to deny categorial status to properhood, implicitly invoking the concept of a word being “used as” something else. He takes issue (Coates 2005: 129) with “perhaps the most commonly-held of all views about name-expressions [viz.] that they are either proper or not proper”. Coates’ problem with such a view arises from “expressions which have an equal claim to be called proper names but which are identical in form with non-proper expressions”: (a) “The Old Vicarage” compared with (b) “the old vicarage”. The proposed, rather ultra-Millian, resolution is to deny categorial status to the label “proper”, and to invoke modes of reference: (a) lacks sense, and is therefore associated with onymic reference; (b) is sense-bearing, and is associated with semantic reference. Properhood is released from categorial association with nouns: it is a mode of reference, and whether an expression is being used with onymic reference (as a “proper name”, in (a)), or not (as a common expression, in (b)) cannot be known without insight into the speaker’s intent or the hearer’s interpretative response. Again, it seems to be claimed that a word or a phrase can be “used as” a name, or as not a name (Colman 2006: 137-138 offers a critique of Coates 2005).

A name is a word, as put with welcome bluntness by Brendler (2005: 109): “[e]in Name ist ein Wort”. And it is not something “used as” something else (as implied by Sandred 1997, discussed in §3 above). Compare, or rather, contrast, the preceding suggestions with Jespersen’s (1924: 62) strict separation of identical forms (on the basis of syntactic distribution) as representing words of different classes: “even if round and love and a great many other English words belong to more than one word-class, this is true of the isolated form only: in each separate case in which the word is used in actual speech it belongs definitely to one class and to no other”. And further: “[t]o form a verb from another word is not the same thing as using a substantive as a verb, which is impossible”. See also page 52, on the ghost in Hamlet going “slow and stately”: slow is not an adjective used as an adverb, but “slow really is an adverb, just as long in ‘he stayed long’ is an adverb, even if the form is the same in ‘a long stay’, where it is an adjective”. Mill (1919: 28-29), too, shows himself to be a welcome anti-polysemist as clear from
the following treatment of “a name used analogically or metaphorically; that is, a name which is predicated of two things, not univocally, or exactly in the same
signification, but in significations somewhat similar”. Of brilliant in a brilliant light and a brilliant achievement he observes that this “word, however, is just as properly two names instead of one, in this case, as in that of the most perfect ambiguity. And one of the commonest forms of fallacious reasoning arising from ambiguity, is that of arguing from a metaphorical expression as if it were literal; that is, as if a word, when applied metaphorically, were the same name as when taken in its original sense”. The word brilliant in the former example is “primary”. The same form in the latter example represents a different word derived from the primary one by a type of word-formation: conversion (compare other types of word-formation signalled by affixation or internal stem-mutation, for instance: see §5 below).

Nouns and names are not “functionally interchangeable”, as claimed by Pulgram (1954: 25). A name based on a common word (Haymarket, above), whether a noun or not, has been converted from a word of one class to a word of another, just as a name can be converted to a word of a different class: the possible acquisition by names in a particular society of “more or less definite associations” (Lyons 1977: 219, §7.5), and their possible transference to the class of “common” nouns. Transference of name to common word, as illustrated above and below, can be classed as a type of word-formation via metaphor/metonymy (by the process of conversion), as discussed in Colman and Anderson (2004). In examples such as The suits/anoraks/green-wellies/skirts/rednecks have arrived, “by an act of metonymy, the meaning of a noun has been extended to apply to a set of humans on the basis of that noun’s denoting some aspect of appearance perceived as characteristic” (Colman – Anderson 2004: 3). Thus, too, are characteristics associated with the archetypal bearer of a name (Jezebel, Walter Mitty, Sandwich, Cardigan) transferred as eponymy to apply to a set of humans or objects, in the formation of a common word.

I regard as irrelevant the sorts of variation in the use of initial capital letters remarked by, for instance, Pulgram (1954: 20 n. 67), who claims that this is “a strong indication of the degree to which a name has become a true noun”. Rather, I agree with the following observations by Seppännen, whose examples of names converted to common words retain the initial capitals. Seppännen (1974: 42, 46) regards non “canonical” morphosyntactic behaviour of names as evidence of derivation from name to noun: via metaphor in, e.g. your Webster, (America’s) Vanderbilts, and via metonymy in, e.g. an awful lot of Brahms. The items are not the names “but merely homonyms of these names”. “Article contrast” entails also number contrast. Seppänen (1974: 95-96) notes not only, e.g., the Denmark of today, with definite article, but a Denmark that does not exist today, with indefinite. Seppänen (1974: 97) points out that the names here “will therefore have to
be treated as count nouns”, otherwise “proper names will then have both the article contrast and the number contrast which are normally considered critical for count nouns…”. In the phrase another John, cited above, from Van Langendonck (2005: 319, who views it as illustrating polysemy), the name has been converted to a common word: a common word derived from a name.

4.2. Names and nominals

In §4.1. above I referred to the supposed criterion of intersubstitutability of nouns and names in syntactic contexts, as one of the types of (morpho)syntactic criteria for classifying names which is insufficient and non-universal. But in any case, names are not intersubstitutable with bare nouns. Rather, names function as one of what Lyons (1977: 178-179) identifies as the three main kinds of singular definite referring expressions in English, distinguished from each other grammatically: (a) definite noun phrases, (b) “proper names”, (c) personal pronouns; that is, expressions by which a speaker identifies for the hearer the referent of his utterance (Lyons 1977: 177; and see Lyons 1977: 640; “three grammatically distinct kinds of singular definite referring expressions: proper names, definite noun-phrases and pronouns”). So, too, Duke (2005: 139) summarises the findings of Werner (1974), to the effect that names are one of “three possibilities of referring to a specific entity”, the others being pronouns and definite descriptions with appellatives. What these share is the capacity for definite reference; in a determiner phrase (or noun phrase) this is conveyed by a definite determiner. And these three expressions are classified by Lyons (1977: 425) as nominals (nominals may, of course, be indefinite, but our concern here is with definite referring expressions: see also Conrad 1985: 44-45 for an interpretation of names as a type of definite noun phrase). So a name is not a noun, but a type of nominal.

Of the “three possibilities of referring to a specific entity” (quoted above from Duke 2005: 139), names function the most precisely. As Clark (1995 [2002]: 115) puts it, “[t]he essential thing about any and every personal name, at whatsoever date and in whatsoever society current, is that, within its own proper context, it signifies one unique individual. Names are in practice often duplicated; but such accidents in no way impugn the principle that each instance is necessarily intended to specify one, and only one, individual”. For Smith-Bannister (1997: 15), the “ultimate form of classification is that which identifies the named as an individual by distinguishing him from all others”. Duke’s (2005: 139) discussion of African anthroponyms is based on the premise that the primary, universal function of names is “the precise identification of referents”; and this correlates with the monoreferential function attributed to names by Nübling (2005: cited in §2 above). This premise will become seminal to the characterisation of names in what follows.
This function of individual identification is associated by many, following the tradition of John Stuart Mill, with a purely referential function, as opposed to the lexical-semantically richer function of common words. Unlike common words, “proper names denote but do not connote; they have reference, but not sense” (Colman 2004: 185; see, in particular, Pulgram 1954: 42-48; Lyons 1977: §7.5; Thrane 1980: 216, 222; Conrad 1985). I do not elaborate here on philosophical versus linguistic uses of terminology such as “connotation” and “denotation”, and “sense” and “reference”, simply referring to Lyons (1977: 175, 197).

Characteristics associated with the archetypal bearer of a name (Jezebel, Walter Mitty, cited in §4.1. above) transferred as eponymy to apply to a set of humans, in the formation of a common word, do not presuppose denotational content for the base names: “the lexical semantics of the derived noun is based on speakers’ encyclopaedic knowledge of the person associated with the names; the name itself has no lexical semantics to transmit” (Anderson – Colman 2000: 9). I return to this in §4.4. below, in a slight revision of a strict Millian view.

Names, then, like pronouns, are words which function as nominals, and have no range of denotation. The morpho-syntactic behaviour of names (different from that of common words) is a corollary of their lexical semantic poverty. It is not a “criterion”, but rather, a symptom of the (non-)semantics of names. But precisely what category do names belong to?

In accord with the classification of names as nominals, sharing a capacity for definite reference (as well as other motivations not to be detailed here), Anderson (2003, 2004) groups determiners, pronouns, and names together as members of a class of determinatives. As I said above, however, the capacity for definite reference in a determiner phrase is conveyed by a definite determiner, by a phrasal head which must have a dependent. But names and pronouns do not govern, and thus differ from determiners.

4.3. Names are names

Revising the characterisation of names as determinatives, Anderson (2007: ch. 8, §2) invokes (among other things) the similarities between names and pronouns: as just observed in the preceding section, they share at least the property of not governing; and like names, pronouns have no range of denotation (§4.2. above). Yet they share with definite determiners the capacity for definite reference (§4.2. above).

But unlike definite determiners, as Anderson (2007) argues, the definiteness associated with names and pronouns is not inherent. For pronouns, “[t]heir definiteness is satisfied by the discourse, not in the lexicon” (Anderson 2007: 266); their capacity for definite reference emerges in the speech act. Names are inher-
ently non-definite (that is, neither definite nor indefinite). Their capacity for definite reference emerges only when they function as arguments. Let me explain this in terms of the three uses often subsumed under the term “naming” as given by Lyons (1977: 216-218): in nomination, as vocative, and as referential.

Nominations confer a name, they assign identity. They do not assume the hearer can identify the referent (they do not assume definiteness). Vocatives identify the person addressed by their name; prior nomination is assumed. Here, definiteness is superfluous: that is, assuming that the hearer can identify the referent is superfluous, because the hearer is being told s/he is the addressee. In *Basil!*, we have what Jespersen (1924: 184) calls “a sentence in itself”, and Anderson (2004: §3.2, 2007: 283), a “complete predication”, overtly recalling Sweet’s (1891: 50) “a sentence word”. Anderson (2007: 283) interprets vocativeness as a “mood” feature: a feature associated with verbals. Then, a name may be referential, in a speech act in which the name specifies the entity referred to. In *I (don’t) like Basil*, the name functions as an argument. And to function as an argument it acquires definiteness. The acquisition of definiteness, by which a name can function as an argument, creates in the lexicon “a derived category out of a name” (Anderson 2003: 353, 2007: chapter 8: §1.2). The name acquires the secondary feature \{definite\}. Only argumental names are definite. In both nominations and vocatives, names remain non-definite. Therefore, names and pronouns, unlike definite determiners, are not inherently definite.

But there is still a semantic bond between names and one type of determiner: deictic determiners (or demonstratives, in the traditional terms). Names, though not themselves deictic, share with deictics (including the first and second person pronouns) the capacity for individual identification, without recourse to anaphora or description. With deictics, “it is appeal to speech-act context that enables the deictics to provide identification of arguments” (Anderson 2007: 246). This is represented by Anderson (2007: 243) as the secondary feature “speech act participant”, or \{sap\}, location with respect to \{sap\}. But names are even stronger, because their capacity for primary identification is not dependent on immediate context. What names have is “fixed reference”. “By virtue of their fixed reference, names allow primary identification, for which functions other elements of primary identification depend on deixis” (Anderson 2007: 290). By the act of nomination, a name is “fixed” to an individual (person or place). The name is then available for use as a (nondefinite) vocative, or a (derived definite) argument.

Features such as “speech act participant”, “fixed reference”, “definite” are features of secondary categories which may be associated with primary (word-class) categories. As a secondary feature, “definite” is inherent for definite determiners, but non-inherent for names and pronouns. But other secondary features still may be associated with the category of name.
4.4. On the “content” of names

The strictly Millian view of names as having “reference, but not sense” was invoked in §4.2. above. Yet names have some content relevant to their linguistic characterisation. Distinctions between gender, and between person vs. place are secondary categorial distinctions which form part of the “content” of names.

Distinctions between personal versus place names, and for the former, at least, distinctions of gender, are part of the language user’s linguistic competence. In languages with overtly expressed grammatical gender, the gender of place names must also be listed, for their appropriate use. In Greek, for instance, place names not only reflect gender, but are (invariably) either singular or plural, as in the following town-names: η Πύλος (singular, feminine), τα Τρίκαλα (plural, neuter).

And “it is one element of the meaning of John or Plato that it denotes a person, not a place, etc.” (Seppänen 1974: 158). So, too, for Sweet (1891: §163) “it is part of the meaning of such proper names as John and Plato that they denote persons, not places, etc.”, and that these names identify male human beings (cf. Mary), thus conveying a gender distinction.

Thrane (1980: 214), however, argues that “proper names are non-categorial signs, which means that they do not in any way indicate what kind of thing they are being used to refer to on a given occasion”. Thus, while traditional onomastics, as illustrated in the preceding quotations, draws distinctions between name-types, depending on whether they identify people or places, and if the former, whether male or female, and if the latter, what kind of place, Thrane seems to dismiss the linguistic significance of such distinctions by labelling them as “conventional” (so also, Lyons 1977: 221).

But conventionality is not evidence against linguistic categoriality. If the person/place distinction, and that of gender, in names are to be dismissed on the grounds that they are “conventional”, then much of language would have to be relegated to non-linguistic categories. Anderson (2003: 355) draws attention to the “conventionality” of grammatical gender associated with common words: the “word table in French is feminine, by ‘convention’, and happens to be a term for an item of furniture; but this is not to deny the appropriateness to the analysis of French of the category of grammatical gender”. “Linguistic systems as a whole are largely conventional” (Anderson 2007: 113). Therefore, “[w]e can legitimately infer that, unless there is contra-indication, anything referred to as Mary is human and female, just as we can infer that anything referred to as a/the crone is human and female, as well as old” (Anderson 2007: 119).

These distinctions, between person and place, and between genders, represent inherent secondary features of the names, analogous, for instance, with the
inherent secondary features of grammatical – or natural – gender on nouns. Such distinctions, then, have a place in linguistic representations of names, as suggested in what follows.

Naming systems are primarily anthropocentric; so the unmarked name is “redundantly personal” (Anderson 2003: 373). Content is added to a personal name, however, by specification of gender: \{m/f\}. Specification that the fixed referent of a name is a place, adds “content” which distinguishes place names from personal names. Anderson (2007: 9.1.2) characterises this in terms of the secondary feature \{loc(ative)\}, a feature otherwise associated with the category of case. My account here is, of course, a necessary oversimplification of the issue of “core” versus “non-core” names and the significance of the concept of prototypicality as presented by Anderson (2003: 374, 2007: 116); and it brutally ignores distinctions between morphological structures of names referring to different types of places, as discussed also by, e.g., Van Langendonck (1998), Anderson (2003: 359).

That \{m/f\} and \{loc\} are secondary features of grammatical categories allows the admission of some “content” to names without drastically modifying a basic Millian view of names as lacking “sense”. Despite the content attributed to names, a Millian position can be maintained as long as we recognise secondary categories, which do not indicate differences in range of denotation. Admission of some linguistic content to names explains why names may also become associated with purely encyclopaedic information (§4.2. above; Anderson 2003: 374, 2007: 116), and thus susceptible to conversion, via metaphor or metonymy, to words of other classes. So, for instance, the name Brahms, having the “content” of “personal” and “masculine”, can acquire encyclopaedic information as the name of a male composer, and become available for conversion (via metonymy) to a common word, as illustrated in §4.1. above.

Names are an intrinsic part of a linguistic system. While in many instances, conversion of names to common words and vice versa is not signalled by any change in the structure of the word (analogous with conversions of common words of one class to those of another such as hammer, noun, to hammer, verb), it is not surprising that names may be distinguished formally from other word classes (again analogous with morphologically signalled derivation of a common word of one class from one of another, such as fruitful, adjective, derived from fruit, noun). So we come now to derivational morphology.

5. Names and derivational morphology

In an extended word and paradigm model (see, e.g., Anderson 1985; S. R. Anderson 1977; Colman 1985; Matthews 1970, 1972, 1974), a distinction is made between word-forms which express inflectional secondary categories
Names, derivational morphology, and Old English gender

from those which express derivational categories. “Derivational morphology expresses relationships between words of different syntactically and/or semantically definable classes (or sub classes) (e.g. between a verb and a noun, or a negative and a positive noun). Inflectional morphology is concerned with word-forms which may reflect syntactic relations (e.g. the relation between a verb and its subject or object, or between a preposition and its object…” Colman 1994: 143; see also Colman 1994: §2.4, as well as Colman 1996a, for discussion of some controversial classifications of inflection vs. derivation in Old English). Inflectional morphology is, then, not class-changing, while derivational morphology expresses a change of class.

The derivation of a word of one (word or lexical-semantic) class from a word of another may be effected by conversion, whereby no formal alteration signals the derivation (hammer noun/hammer verb, cited in §4.4. above). In Germanic languages, as illustrated here from English, such derivation may be signalled morphologically, by affixation (fruit/fruitful, §4.4. above; lucky/unlucky) and/or by root-modification (long/length). And derivation of a word from more than one base, creates the morphological structure of a compound (planespotter). Such devices are not, of course, restricted to Germanic: the present discussion is simply to serve as a reminder of the familiar. Derivation may also be signalled by shift of word-accent, as in, e.g., English convict/convict, or Greek φαλάκρας, noun, ‘bald-headed person’, acc., gen, sg. φαλάκρα/φαλάκρός, adjective, ‘bald, bare’, neut. nom. pl. φαλακρά. A base word is changed to a word of a different (word or lexical-semantic) class; and a language may have means of expressing overtly the product of this derivation. Similarly, when a name is based on a common word (in the sense given in §3 above), the derivation may be overtly signalled or not.

The English personal name Patience, and the Old English personal name Brid, for instance, illustrate formation of a name from a common word by means of conversion: there is no morphological signalling. Polish Kowalski (§3 above) exemplifies word-formation by suffixation. Transference of word-accent in ancient Greek names corresponds to the signalling of class differences between common words by accent-shift, as illustrated above. And German family names have become synchronically analysable as signalled by root-modification (Müller differentiated from the common word Müller; and the “opaque” Stratz modified to the point of suppletion).

The charter form <Earhiðes> discussed by Sandred (1997), cited in §3 above, is also morphologically complex, in that it is suffixed. But in this instance, the suffix, represented by <es>, is not an exponent of derivational morphology. It expresses a feature of the secondary category of gender (cumulatively with case), a category associated with declension-class words in Old English. It is therefore to be viewed as an inflectional, rather than a derivational
exponent. But its expression of masculine gender, rather than feminine, signals a change of declension class from the base word, OE *ēarhýð*. This common word has been converted, with no derivational morphological signalling, to a name: specifically a place name of a particular type. The uninflected feminine common noun *ēarhýð* is identical with the uninflected name *Earhyð*. I repeat Sandred (1997: 322, quoted in §3 above) that “when the charter was drawn up, the designation *ēarhýð* ‘gravel landing-place’ was no longer associated with the landing place which had given rise to the name but now stood for a large estate, a big piece of land or a settlement. Land, cultivation and settlement were often expressed by nouns which were masc. or neuter in OE...”; “the original meaning was less and less often realized, the whole more and more isolated from its parts”. The word no longer has the range of denotation associated with common words: its “content” is reduced to that of fixed reference to a type of place (in Nübling’s terms, it is “monoreferential”).

A similar type of conversion seems to have occurred in the formation of Old English dithematic personal names. Second elements, or deuterothemes, cognate with feminine common words, occur on names known to refer to males. This, as I illustrate shortly, contradicts Barley’s (1974: 6) claim that Old English personal names “were marked sexually according to the gender of the last element, male names ending in a masculine, female in a feminine”. Barley’s claim for a correlation between natural and grammatical gender echoes that of Woolf (1939: 3 n.5): “[i]t was customary for the name of a man to have a second element grammatically masculine, for the name of a woman to have a second element grammatically feminine” (so also, Kemble 1846; Schramm 1957: 120). Woolf adds, however: “but even here there are exceptions”.

Colman (1988: 122) regards as “outdated” such claims as cited above, for a correlation between natural and grammatical gender in Old English names: “[t]he grammatical gender of the cognate word does not correlate with the natural gender of the referent of a name: e.g., the second element in the male-referring name *Godcild* is cognate with the neuter noun *cild*, ‘child’; that in *Ælfnoð*, with the feminine noun *noð*, ‘temerity’”. The same is expressed in Colman (1996b: 15): “I have taken it that earlier association of grammatically masculine and feminine elements with naturally male and female referents has been discredited” (see also Colman 1984: §5.2.a.ii, 1992: 54-55).

Lass (1995: 96-97) points out that in the ninth-century Liber Vitae (Sweet 1885: 153) “we find that the putative grammatical gender of deuterothemes correlates overwhelmingly with sex: there are no women with -*wulf*, -*here*, no men with -*burg*, -*hild*, -*gifu*”. The table of names from Bede’s History presented by Ström (1939: xliii-xliii) suggests a similar generalisation. But, while the female-referring dithematic names I have had access to indeed have grammatically feminine deuterothemes, there are such deuterothemes which are recorded
for male-referring names only: never for female-referring ones. Examples are noth (e.g., Ælfnoth), laf (e.g., Anlaf), mund (e.g., Eadmund). Bearers of such names recorded in the Toronto Corpus are identifiable as male by, for instance, collocations and anaphoric references such as <Anlaf> : <of his firde ofsloh> ‘slain by his army’, <Brihtlaf> : <was se forma man> ‘was the formost man’, <Wærlaf> : <hatte Wærstanes fæder> ‘was called W.’s father’, <Gifemund> : <biscop> ‘bishop’, and so on.

It is significant, however, that male-referring names have grammatically masculine inflections, whatever the grammatical gender of the second, potentially inflecting, element (Coates 1993: 1185; Colman 1996b: 15; pace Colman 1992: 55). The following examples (from the Toronto Corpus) of Old English personal names formed with grammatically feminine deuterothemes are illuminating. The male name Wulfnoth, with a deuterotheme cognate with a grammatically feminine noun (noð ‘temerity’), is given the grammatically masculine (strong declension) genitive suffix in, e.g. <Wulfnoþes Cywyde> ‘Wulfnoth’s speech’, <Godwine Wulfnoþes suna> ‘Godwine, Wulfnoth’s son’, <Wulfnoþes mæsse> ‘Wulfnoth’s Mass’ (compare the strong feminine genitive suffix represented by <e> for the common noun: Campbell 1959: §585). The suffix represented by <es> appears also on genitive forms of the name Eadmund, with deuterotheme cognate with OE mund f. ‘hand, power’, again ‘instead of’ the grammatical feminine suffix represented by <e>: <Eadmundes swurdbora> ‘Eadmund’s sword-bearer’, <Eadmundes kynges> ‘of King Eadmund’, <þa fæng Eadwig to rice, Eadmundes sunu kinges> ‘then came to power Eadwig, King Eadmund’s son’, <hi wareon Eadmundes suna cyningas> ‘they were sons of King Eadmund’ (and numerous instances of forms such as <Seint Eadmundes byrig> ‘Bury St. Edmunds’). Similarly, a strong masculine genitive form of the name Ordlaf (deuterotheme laf f. ‘remainder’) appears in <on Ordlafes gewitnesse>.

This suggests that the feminine common words, noð, mund, laf have been converted to masculine name deuterothemes, noð, mund, laf. As with the conversion of ēarhyð to the place-name Earhyð, the feminine and masculine nominative forms are syncretic: there is no overt derivational morphological signal. But inflected forms reflect the conversion of a word of one gender to a word of a different gender, and a different class: a common word to a name (-element).

6. Conclusion

Names constitute a primary category. They do not constitute a sub-class of nouns. They are characterised in notional terms as having “fixed reference”, but no range of denotation, though linguistic content is added to names in the form of secondary categories: “person” vs. “place”, and for the former (and in some language, the latter also), “gender”. This notional property determines the mor-
pho-syntactic distribution of names (which in turn distinguishes for the hearer/reader the identity of names distinct from any homophonous words of other classes). Formal signalling of “name-hood” in the form of a word is part of the derivational morphology of a language, by which word-class distinctions may be signalled in the structure of a word.

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