WHAT IS INFINITIVAL *TO?*

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1. INTRODUCTION

In (1981:18-20). Chomsky argued that *to* is *Infl* in clauses such as those emphasised in (1)

(1) a. the students prefer *for Bill to visit Paris*
    b. I am anxious *for John to finish by Friday*

The example in (1a) is cited from Chomsky (1981:18), while that in (1b) is taken recently from Radford (1988:303). Chomsky (1981:18-19) had pointed out the similarity of structure between the dependent clauses emphasised in (2a, b), both being taken to have the structure: *Comp [NP-Infl-VP]*.

(2) a. the students prefer *that [Bill should visit Paris]*
    b. the students prefer *for [Bill to visit Paris]*
    c. the students prefer *Bill to visit Paris*
    d. the students prefer *[him to visit Paris]*

Examples (2c, d) are a reminder that such sentences include *exceptional clauses* (Radford 1988:317), the status of leftmost NP, marked as accusative, in the infinitive clause being particularly uncertain and accounted for in an *ad hoc* fashion for English alone.

2. THE CONVENTIONAL ANALYSIS OF *TO*

Radford pointed out (1988:304) that the bracketed clause of a sentence such as (2a) has the form [NP M VP), while the bracketed clause of (2b) contains an NP subject *Bill*, 'an Infinitival Particle *to*' and a VP [*visit Paris*]. Radford has continued the conventional notion (along lines familiar from 1981:18-19) 'the

obvious structural parallelism here would suggest that *to* fulfils the same role in infinitive Clauses *that* M [odal] fulfils in indicative Clauses.'

The structural patterns at issue in this paper are those shown in (3)

(3) a. [The students] [$_{VP}$ .want [$_{S'}$ for [$_S$ PRO to [$_{VP}$ visit Paris]]]]
       The students want for to visit Paris
    b. The students [$_{VP}$ prefer [$_{S'}$ COMP [$_S$ Bill INFL [$_{VP}$ visit Paris]]]
       The students prefer that Bill visit Paris
    c. The students [$_{VP}$ prefer/want [$_{S'}$ [$_{COMP}$ to [$_S$ PRO [$_{VP}$ visit Paris]]]]]
       The students prefer/want to visit Paris

(3a) is from Chomsky (1981: 21). The chief characteristics of this example with which I shall be taking issue are

a. *for* as the head of S', in the position of what is usually termed *complementiser*. That this is being taken as its role in (3a) can be seen from comparison with (3b) (from Chomsky, 1981: 18) where the position is shown as COMP and filled by *that*.

b. *to* in (3a) at the structural position shown in (3b) as Infl. If *Infl* (-*tense*) were the role of *to* then it would be necessary to explain why it does not feature in such subjunctive sentences as (3b). The same question would need an answer whatever the *nonfinite* constituent that was being claimed. By the present linguistic conventions it is *to* that needs this explanation.

The counter-example shown as (3c) sums up the essence of the arguments which I shall put forward in this paper
a. *To* fulfils the role of COMP in the nonfinite clause
b. The status and functioning of *for* is in need of proper definition.

3. THE LOCUS OF *TO*

The relative order in d-structure of *to* and PRO is at least one important point in determining the role of *to*. An important indication of the order is provided by the Projection Principle. Remember the central importance of this principle: it 'has the consequence of substantially reducing the specification of the categorial component for a particular grammar' (Chomsky 1981: 31). Thus the ordering of items in s-structure must ensure the reflection of orders and relations in d-structure. Rules of surface phenomena such as examples of contraction provide insights, for linguist as for learner, to the abstract configurations. The Projection Principle is so important to the avoidance of redundancy in linguistic analysis that apparent failures in its operation must be taken as throwing doubt on the analyses[1].

[1] Note that my argument is based here on the sufficient conditions for the blocking of

Chomsky remarked (1986: 215, n. 102)

that PRO in the structure underlying [*I don't wanna visit them*] and [*who do you wanna visit*] does not block contraction, as distinct from *wh* – trace...

If it were necessary to make *ad hoc* exceptions for certain types of empty category it would be a very serious criticism of present linguistic theory. But such a distinction is not at all necessary, at least as far as the 'wanna'[2] data are concerned. The underlying structures of (4)

(4) a. Who do you wanna play?
    b. Who do you want to play (John)?

are those represented in (5)

(5) a. [$_{S''}$ [$_{C''}$ Who$_1$ [$_{S'}$ do you want [$_{C'}$ to [$_S$ PRO play t_1]]]]]
    b. [$_{S''}$ [$_{C''}$ Who$_1$ [$_{S'}$ do you want t_1 [$_{C'}$ to [$_S$ PRO$_1$ play [e]]]]]]

PRO, it can now be seen, cannot precede *to* if the 'wanna' data are to be of any value to an understanding of the internal relations of linguistic levels. *To* is not then located where *Infl* might be expected in d-structure.

4. THE CONSTITUENCY OF *TO*

I will leave for a moment the discussion of what the structure of the sentences in (2) could really be. First of all there are the arguments supporting the proposal for the inclusion of *to* in *Infl*. One of those cited by Radford (1988: 304 from Chomsky 1977: 87)) is 'that Modals cannot co-occur with *to* (cf. *can to/*to can)' and so, it was argued, *to* must be a modal. Such a test could only have a possible late use as a fine tuner. The modal and *to* may well be shown to be mutually exclusive. But there is first need for a reliable test of constituency to discover the role played by *to* in the infinitive. After all, it may turn out that just as *to for is ungrammatical, so in reality is *for to* in contrast with *for* [e] *to*.

For the testing of constituency, Radford recommended a test proposed by Bresnan (1976: 17). Bresnan there assumed that the categorisation of *to* as

contraction. Much of the present-day discussion has moved on to the question of what constitutes *Government*. It was in this light that Postal and Pullum complained (1986: 109) 'that theoretical arguments from contraction facts over the last ten years have been heavily oversold.'

[2] Jaeggli (1980: 204) listed the following as offering contracted forms: *going to, have to* (and *got to*), *ought to, used to, supposed to. Ought to* and *supposed to* are untestable since the verb constituents do not take a direct object NP complement. There is, of course, a more extensive rule of English: that the final voiced plosive of a verb will devoice before *to* if no underlying element interrupts them.

'auxiliary element' (which would rank it like *do*, an unquestioned resident of *Infl*) was a test of true VP Deletion, shown in (6a). However, the block in Bresnan's example results from selectional restrictions, exemplified in (6b)[3]. It is easy enough to show (in 6c) that *Verb + to* is not necessarily excluded from behaving as a lexical verb.

(6) a. First people began pouring out of the building, and then smoke did [e]/*began [e]/began to [e].
  b. *smoke began/the smoke began/war began
  c. John started singing and then Fred began [e]/began to [e]/did [e]

Moreover, from (6c) it can be seen that whereas the gap after both *began* and *began to* is governed by the stem of *singing*, the gap after *did* is governed by the stem of *started*. In Bresnan's example there is no equivalence between the gaps after *did* [begin to pour put], governed by the higher verb, and after *began to* [pour out], governed by the lower verb. In (6c) the content of [e] governed by *began* is [to sing] and thus like *began to* [sing], not like *did* [begin to sing].

4.1. *TO* AS HEAD OF CONSTITUENT

Nothing so far can be said to have been a decisive argument for or against *to* as *Infl*. Proof positive must look to constituent tests of the kind proposed in Radford (1988: 89-105) and now included (with my data and adaptations) below.

4.1.1. COMPARABLE DISTRIBUTION

The examples (7a-f) show a *nonfinite* clause and a *finite* clause occupying identical structural positions. The sentences (7a-c) are undoubtedly grammatical. Ungrammaticality results (7d) from the gapping of (*for*) *to*. The ungrammaticality of (7e) is surprising in that *Comp-(that)* is often gapped in English. But here, like *to*, it is required to be overt. The similarity of *to* and *that*

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[3] Bresnan was not out to prove the status of *to*, but to use the assumed functioning of *to* as an 'auxiliary element' as one test in her discussion of 'the relation between the grammatical form and the logical form of sentences of natural language.' Just as the selection conditions in (3a) outweigh the syntactic, the *to* metric for VP Deletion proposed by Bresnan (1976: 17) does not stand up to lexical change. This I illustrate here in (I), where Bresnan's example is in (Ia)

(I) a. John didn't go, because he didn't want to/*because he didn't want
w b. John didn't go, because he didn't ask to/didn't ask
  c. What didn't John ask? To go.

(Ic) is a proof that *ask* is adequate to precede a VP-gap. Not only does it once again flaw Bresnan's proof but in so doing must throw into doubt the categorisation of *to* as mere auxiliary element.

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thus extends from their structural pairing to the conditions on gapping. It is equally telling, of course, that (7a-c) can be grammatical without a similar condition appearing to block the gapping of *for*. (f), with a nonfinite clause similar to that of (3a) is of doubtful grammaticality for me. Sentences like (7g), with a reversed order of *finite* and *nonfinite* clause, and *for to* initiating the *nonfinite* clause, are quite ungrammatical. Yet (7h) is undoubtedly grammatical, where *for to* has instead the structure *for NP to*.

(7) a. [[e_{for}] to PRO sing in the bath] and [that the neighbours join in] *is annoying*.
  b. John expects [that he will see his friends] and [[e_{for}] to [PRO greet them]
  c. John expects [[e_{for}] to meet his friends] and [that he will sing for joy]
  d. *John expects [[e_{for to}] meet his friends] and [that he will sing for joy]
  e. *John expects [to meet his friends] and [[e_{that}] he will sing for joy]
  f. ?John expects [for to meet his friends] and [that he will sing for joy]
  g. *John expects [that he will see his friends] and [for to [PRO greet them]
  h. [That someone sings in the bath] and [for the neighbours to join in] *is annoying*
  i. [That someone sings in the bath]/[That there is singing in the bath] and [to yodel every so often] is annoying
  j. For him to eat cabbage means nothing
  k. *This means for him to eat cabbage
  l. This requires him to eat cabbage

In such constructions as (7a-i) neither *to* nor *that* can be gapped, yet there are structural blocks on the presence of *for*. There is no doubt about the status of *that*, as *finite comp*. The examples in (7a-i) show *to* behaving in *nonfinite clauses* in ways much more similar to the structural behaviour of *that* than does *for*. Bresnan had difficulty (1979: 78) aligning *for* with *that*, finding that though *for* could appear in a subject clause (7j) it did not seem to be grammatical in a sentence such as (7k). But then *to* is not so inconsistent and can appear in both kinds of sentence (e.g. (7l), where it is in an object clause).

4.1.2. DETERMINATION BY MOVEMENT

Interrogative inversion involves the exchange of positions by a verbal element and a nominal element. The bracketed strings of (8) are shown to be NP as well as being S.[4] Ungrammaticality enters (8d) when the inverted clause is initialised by *for to*. This is saved (8e) when the structure is understood to be *for NP to*. The pertinent question to ask is why *for* is grammatical when immediately

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[4] Without the clause boundary, of course, *can/to* would be found in (8b).

preceding NP. But such a question is otiose as long as we acknowledge *for as P''*.

(8) a. Does [to sing in the bath] count as a crime?
b. Can [to sing in the bath] count as a crime?
c. Does [that John sings in the bath] count as a crime?
d. *Does [for to sing in the bath] count as a crime?
e. Does [for them to sing in the bath] count as a crime?
f. John would be there
g. Would John be there?
h. John to be there
i. *To John be there

There is a structural parallel (only, of course, if *to* is taken as being *Infl* like *would*) between (8f, g) and (8h[5], i). But *to* cannot be used as *Infl* for the interrogative inversion (8i), as can *would*.

4.1.3. TRACE AS CONSTITUENT

The empty category fronted in (9a) can be filled equally by (9b, d-f). Overt *to* or *that* is essential to ensure grammaticality (cf (9c)). That *to* is not there to ensure the representation of tense is clear from (9d), where the *nonfinite auxiliary* is what ensures this. It would be strange if the role of *to*, rarely gapped, was in fact to represent *tense*. The absence of *tense* is characteristic of the type of clause in which *to* is clearly a constituent.

(9) a. [[e] in the bath] [can *t* be annoying]?
    What in the bath can be annoying?
b. [to [PRO sing]]
c. *[[PRO sing]]
d. to have sung
e. [that someone sings]
f. [that someone has sung]

4.1.4. S-ADVERBIAL INSERTION

Radford points out (1988: 93) that an *S-adverbial* (or *discourse adverb*) cannot be inserted in an NP or PP. This is surely not so. A discourse adverb, like all adverbs, cannot govern a noun (10a), but can govern an adjective in what must be an NP (10b) or a PP (10c).

(10) a. *The honestly mariner is wary of flattery
b. The honestly ancient mariner is kind
c. The logic is in honestly bad taste

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[5] This use of the infinitive for listing is grammatical for me.

I am aware that a *split infinitive* is considered by many linguists as a straw man. For them the argument on which I am now to embark may seem less than compelling. Nevertheless, there can be no denying the sensitivity (frequently untutored) of speakers for the conditions on insertion between *to* and the *nonfinite verb*. Something of this is found in Chomsky (1981: 138, n. 4)

> One might argue that at surface structure, *to-visit* becomes a single word.
> For expository purposes, I ignore this possibility here.

The uncertainty about the grammaticality of (11a) does not attach in the slightest to (11d). The insertion of S-adverbial between *Infl* and *V* which applies without inhibition for (11d) is far less certain in (11a). If there is doubt about the force of this inhibition consider (11b), where a sentence adverb can be inserted between *to* and *for* with far less uncertainty than if it involved an S-adverbial. It cannot be that the structural account given in (11e) holds equally for (11a). This must be enough to raise doubts about the status of *to* as *Infl*.

(11) a. ?John expects to certainly see Mary
b. John expects to sometimes see Mary
c.   *Infl*(?) -Adv- V
d. John will certainly see Mary
e.   *Infl*-Adv-   V
f. John can certainly sing in the bath
g. John certainly will see Mary
h. John certainly can sing in the bath
i. Certainly John will/can see Mary

If my feeling is right in preferring the locus of S-adverbial in (11d, f) to its structural position in (11g, h) this provides further evidence of the proper locus for the insertion of the S-adverbial, between *NPl* and *Infl* (other than at *specifier*, as in (11h)).

We see that there is doubt concerning the grammaticality of S-adverbial insertion between *to* and *V*. This is not comparable with any inhibition on S-adverbial insertion which occurs between *Infl* and V. The inhibition on S-adverbial insertion between *to* and *V* cannot be due to any single-word status which *to-V* might be said to have. No expressive force results from the insertion when it happens (as would be the case in an utterance such as *tax in-bloody-spector*).

4.1.5. PARALLEL CONSTITUENCY

This test takes note of the fact that

> *Shared Constituent Coordination* is only possible where the shared string is a possible constituent of each of the conjuncts
>
> (Radford 1988: 78)

From (13a) it can be determined that *I can* is structurally equivalent to *I expect to*. *To* is an essential to the structure of the non-modal clause. Without its overt presence, (13b) is ungrammatical. *For* once again (13c) will not suffice to render the sentence grammatical

(13) a. I can (and I expect to) see them.
    b. *I can (and I expect) see them
    c. *I can (and I expect for) see them
    d. [I can [and I expect for to] see them]
    e. [I can [and I expect [for [e$_{NP}$]] [to [PRO see them]]]]

As long as *to* is overtly present (13d) the inclusion of *for* effects a style change. The reason for this (13e) is the redundancy introduced by the EC governed by *for*. The preposition *for* must be governing an NP and that NP is licensed by the NP of the maximal S. Thus [*for NP*] adds nothing.

4.1.6. ELLIPSIS

It is only VPs that can undergo ellipsis (Radford 1988: 83). In (14) there is clear evidence that the presence of *to* is a matter consequent upon the arguments of a verb (14a, b).

(14) a. You need to be there early but John needn't [e]/*needn't to
    b. You'll need to be there early but John won't/*won't to/won't need to/?won't need

5. THE CONTENDER

5.1. THE FUNCTION OF *FOR*

Bresnan (1972:6-7) stated that 'I take the English Complementizers to be those S-initial morphemes which distinguish clause-types.' Among these she did not hesitate to include *for*, nor did she consider the possibility of any other *Comp* for the nonfinite clause. By 1982, however, Bresnan was using few examples with *for* as the candidate for *Comp*. Lightfoot had argued (1979: 195) that *for* 'has been a preposition throughout its history as a clause-introducer.' In spite of this he concluded (*ibid.*) that because 'PPs cannot in general occur as the subject of a sentence... it seems best to adopt the traditional analysis and say that [for] is simply part of the infinitival morphology.' Lightfoot was correct in suspecting [for NP] as the subject of a clause, and in part correct in arguing

that [for] played a role in the infinitival morphology. The question which I shall address is which role [for] plays[6]. Lightfoot was clear (1979: 188) in rejecting the possibility that [for] was ever *Comp*[7].

(15) a. *Who do the students expect for *t* to visit Paris
    b. Who do the students expect *t* to visit Paris?
    c. *For whom do the students expect *t* to visit Paris
    d. Who do the students make a coat for *t* to wear in Paris?
    e. *Who do the students make a coat *t* to wear in Paris
    f. For whom do the students make a coat *t* to wear in Paris
    g. *Who do the students long *t* to visit Paris
    h. For whom do the students cheer?
    i. They wrote below where there was an arrow
    j. It would be a catastrophe for$_1$ the economy for$_2$ *there* to be a sudden massive influx of women into the job market
    k. [[[a sudden massive influx...] BE] BE catastrophic for the economy]
    l. It would be a catastrophe for$_1$ linguistics [[for$_2$ linguists] to [PRO mistake the identity of the marker of S]]

The ungrammaticality of (15a) shows that NP cannot be fronted without *for*. From this it is possible to conclude that in (15b) *for* has also been fronted as *Wh-Comp*, but then (15c) shows that *for* must not be overt in *Wh-Comp*. This is strange behaviour for an item which has been taken as *Comp*. (15f) is a useful reminder that benefactive *for* is not identical with the *for* which is taken as *Comp*, for there might otherwise be said to be a structural relation between the two kinds of *for*. Lightfoot appeared (1979: 196) to be assuming a close (at least, historical) relationship between them. The grammaticality of (15d-f), with benefactive *for*, is quite the reverse of the *for* under scrutiny in this paper (15a-c). Fortunately, Chomsky (1986:211, fn 69) did not pursue the *for*-phrase analysis of '... a nuisance (for τ))'. If he had pursued the analysis he would surely have fallen into the trap of assuming that this use of *for NP* is essentially the same as that in *it is time [[for PRO] PRO to leave]*, which he characterised (self-consistently but incorrectly) as 'subject of the embedded clause'. The other uses of *for*, illustrated in (15g, h) have clearly much more in common with each other and with benefactive *for* than with the *for* which has been wrongly regarded as *Comp*.

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[6] Interestingly, Quirk *et al* (1985:1004) (citing the sentence: *In order for you to be eligible for a student grant, you parents must receive less than a stipulated annual income*) commented 'Since *for* may be combined with the subordinator *in order to*, it seems to be a device for introducing the subject rather than to be a true subordinator.'

[7] Lightfoot's argument (1979:188) was essentially that if *for* had been *Comp* then cases of *for to* and *for NP* too would both have been found from the earliest times, whereas only *for to* are to be found in the earliest texts.

And what is more, its structural behaviour is hardly in accordance with its claimed role of *Comp*. Bresnan (1979: 78) argued for the remarkable difference characterised in (15j) between *for₂* as *Comp* and as preposition *for₁*. She claimed that in taking as its "object" expletive *there* (underlined in (15j)), *for₂* was quite different from preposition *for₁* in e.g. **for there*. There are two distinct faults in Bresnan's argument here. The first is that *for₂* does not govern simply the word initial to a clause, prepositions can govern S and this is what *for₂* is doing in (15j)[8]. If it were otherwise there would be no difficulty in showing the limitation on prepositions like *below* in (15i) **below where*. Moreover, since expletive *there* is *pro* it cannot be governed. The second fault in Bresnan's argument is more interesting. The clause which *for₁* is held to be governing has undergone radical movement. It is only in d-structure (informally represented in (15k)) that the "object" can be identified (underlined in (15k)). I am not of course arguing that *for₁* is not different from *for₂*. I have already shown that there are marked differences from other uses of *for*. However, I reject the idea that *for₂* is other than the morpheme found in [*for NP*]. In (15l) I show how *for₂* fits into the nonfinite clause. From Bresnan's example [*for NP*] clearly belongs to d-structure. For Bresnan the problems remained (1979: 79)

> We have already seen that *for*-complements are in some ways less specific or definite than *that*-complements...

It is strange that Chomsky, although aware (1981:300) of Lightfoot's data, took no account of the possible role of *for NP* (even one shared with its role as *Comp*). The observation could have included the interesting fact that English dialects vary *only* in their toleration of the gapping of NP in the PP [*for NP*]. My dialect does not tolerate gapping, but my dialect (southern British English) has the PP with overt NP, as in the alternative structure *I'd prefer* [pp *for me*] [c *to* [PRO *do it myself*]][9]

PRO in (16) is either arbitrary or controlled by the NP1 of the maximal S. When *for* is present immediately before *to*, there is no variation of control – simply a strong sense for me of rusticity and archaism[10].

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[8] The point is clear enough. Proofs for or against *for* as *Comp* cannot simply be based on the s-structural consequences of movement, such as that which introduces the existential expletive.

[9] It is here that Lightfoot's data (1979:186-187) seem to me to be of most account. He showed that there had been a consistent 200-year gap in Middle English between the appearance of *for to* and its extension to *for NP to*. The gap no doubt represents the time it took for the extension to become part of educated usage and thus to be reflected in the written language. My own usage appears to be following this line, rejecting *for to* but finding *for NP to* quite acceptable.

[10] Quirk *et al* held (1985:1061-1062) that 'The presence of a subject in a *to*-infinitive clause usually requires the presence of a preceding *for*... [1062] But, especially in AmE, certain verbs of wanting and their antonyms allow an optional *for* in the object clause.' This reflected, though with more precision, the comment made by Zandvoort and Van Ek (1975:23) 'There is a tendency,

(16) a. Would [[to [PRO sing in the bath] be annoying]]?
     b. Would [[for Fred] [to [PRO sing in the bath] be annoying]]?
     c. What in the bath would be annoying?
        *[[For me] [to [PRO [e]]]]
        ?[[For [e]] [to [PRO sing]]]

(16a) and (16b) are contrasted by the control of PRO. There is no structural difference other than the additions of [*for NP*] The responses in (16c) differ in grammaticality because of the locus of gapping. Gapping in the controller [*for NP*] does not force ungrammaticality but merely marks it as part of a style (not in my usage). In (17) the examples illustrate object-control, achieved by switching.

(17) a. I like [[for Fred] [to [PRO sing in the bath]]]
     b. I like [[[e] Fred] [to [PRO sing in the bath]]]
     c. I like [[for him] [to [PRO sing in the bath]]]
     d. I like [[[e] him] [to [PRO sing in the bath]]]
     e. The students prefer for [Bill to visit Paris]
     f. The students prefer him to visit Paris
     g. The students prefer for him to visit Paris

Sentences (17a-d) show variations of object-control. The case of the NP, apparent in (17c, d), requires no *ad hoc* account. Accusative case is assigned in a normal way. (17e-g) are longer in need of being termed exceptional.

It is beyond doubt that [*for NP*] alone is adequate for defining control, providing a change in the 'the potential for reference of' *PRO* (Chomsky 1981:6).

6. A SHORT EXCURSION INTO θ-THEORY

Consider the following data

(18) a. John asks Bill to make less noise. *Bill didn't know.
     b. John asks for Bill to make less noise. Bill didn't know.
     c. ask (John, [make less noise], of Bill)
     d. John wants Bill to make less fuss
     e. John wants for Bill to make less fuss

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especially in American English, to use the *for*-construction after verbs and adjectives that do not normally take that preposition.' I find the sentence which Chomsky used (given as (3a) above) to assign *to* to Infl and *for* to Comp quite strange in its use of *for*. I make no comment here on the use of E-language to resolve the problem of what *for* and *to* could possibly be by consigning *for* to 'such dialects as Ozark English' (Chomsky 1986:281, fn 25), which lack 'the for-to filter' (Chomsky 1986:248).

f. want (John, [make less noise], of Bill)
g. The students expect (for) Bill to visit Paris
h. I think that John is a fool
i. I think John is a fool
j. Je viens à voir ma femme
   I come to to-see my wife
   'I happen to see my wife'
k. Je viens de voir ma femme
   I come of to-see my wife
   'I have just seen my wife'

(18a) and (18b) are quite markedly distinct in meaning, as is shown by the test sentence. The difference between the *direct control* (of 18a) and the *indirect control* (of 18b) is due solely to the presence or absence of *for*. It is, of course, strange for the presence or absence of *Comp* to play a lexical role. In English, where *that-comp* can be omitted (18h, i) there is no more than a stylistic difference. In French the variation of *Comp*, as between (18j, k), is accompanied by a difference in meaning, the absence or presence of *Comp* is a syntactic matter not a lexical one. It is clear from (18a, b) that *for* cannot be *Comp*. The same applies to the verbs listed in (19). It is unfortunate that the analysis carried out by Chomsky in (1981, 18) used a verb (18g) which, like that in (18d, e) and those listed as (20), has a far less marked difference in meaning resulting from the absence or presence of *for*. There is a difference in all these cases, but far less obvious than in the case of *ask* and the verbs of (19).

(19) advise, ask, decide, offer, order, prepare promise, rush, try, urge
(20) expect, hate, like, want, wish

The difference between these two categories of verbs lies, as is clear from (18c, f, h), not in the Argument structure. Nor can it be explained by any difference in obligatory control, for (19) contains both subject and object Control verbs. The difference in the salience of the lexical distinction resulting from the presence or absence of *for* arises from the lexical feature content of the verb. It must therefore be argued that assignment of direct or indirect control and the role of [for NP] in the structure of nonfinite clauses bears directly on the account of the lexical organisation of English.

   In (21) are verbs whose infinitive can never be preceded by *for* and thus must be ranked with the modals if *for* is *Comp*

(21) believe, enable, encourage, force, invite, lead, permit, persuade, tell

Once again, these verbs differ in their obligatory control and do not necessarily share Argument structure. Indeed *tell* evidences two distinct Argument structures, as illustrated in (22)

(22) a. Bill tells the story to Natalie
     b. Bill tells Natalie of the story

The only verbs with which [for NP] and not simply [NP] must be used are those given as (23)

(23) agree, deign, plan

This limited appearance would be bizarre if *for* really were *Comp*. *For* can at no time perform the role of *nonfinite-Comp*. This is a role reserved for *to*.

7. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

To has been shown:
   1) to be in a structural position identical to the locus of *that* (7a-c);
   2) to be ungrammatical if gapped (7d), like *that* (7e), where *for* must be gapped (7a-c) or at least its presence causes doubtful grammaticality (7f, g)
Again *to* has been shown
   3) to behave precisely like *that* in cases of inversion (8a-c), though *for* must be gapped (8d) unless it governs NP (8e);
   4) not to behave like a modal (8i) or *aux* as far as inversion is concerned.
Further, it has been shown that
   5) *to V* does not constitute a VP since S-adverbials cannot easily be inserted in such a group (11a, b), though there is no such resistance by a true *Aux V* (11d-f).
It has also been shown that
   6) *for* with the force to change control of PRO is structurally different (15) from homonymic prepositions that lack that force.
It has further been shown that
   7) *for* plays a lexical role in distinguishing direct control of PRO from indirect control. Moreover this lexical role is constrained by the verb in question. *For* does not play a syntactic role, as *Comp* does.
Control theory has appeared to be concerned only with the relationships of PRO to antecedents. This paper offers additional content for the theory through its extension to Control-switching (by means of [(for) (NP)]. It offers an explanation of exceptional case-marking in sentences like (2d), for in the case of the control-switch the NP is case-marked governed by a PP. Control Theory has been shown to apply at d-structure and to be determined by verbal feature specifications in θ-theory. *For* is obligatory for the Argument structure of very few verbs.

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