

LITERATURE

REASON AS A SUPPLEMENTARY RATION IN THOMAS HARDY'S *DESPERATE REMEDIES*

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Critical consensus places Hardy's first novel, *Desperate Remedies*, as a minor, melodramatic work with an out-dated organizing principle. For this very reason, the novel has received very little critical attention. A few recent studies, however, reveal that critics are now beginning to find in this novel some serious subject matters which anticipate the provocative elements in Hardy's later works. J. Hillis Miller (1970: 51—2), for example, has used it to illustrate the divergence (and occasional convergence) between the narrative (narratorial, for Blanchot) voice and the hero's; John Bayley (1978: 95) has used it to demonstrate the subtle "gap" that can exist between a "plot's determined progress, and the tenor of the prose;" G. W. Sherman (1976: 80, 215), among other things, has noted its documentation of the depressing condition of the married poor in London, and the usual theme of unfortunate boys falling in love with girls above their social status. Rosemary Sumner (1981: 15), therefore, was right in agreeing with Hardy's claim in the 1896 Preface to the novel that the characteristics which "provoked most discussion in [his] latest story were present in [his] first — [*Desperate Remedies*] published in 1871, when there was no French name for them..." In this study I shall focus on one such provocative element — the heart/head opposition — and show how the critics' rigorous discussions of dualisms have limited the meaning and importance of Hardy's first novel.

In keeping with the major trend of studies of Hardy's social criticism, the most widely discussed element of social indictment in *Desperate Remedies* is associated with the opposition of the head (reason) and the heart (nature). Because the critics see Hardy as projecting a particular view concerning such oppositions, and because they always see nature triumph over reason in the arguments, they have labelled Hardy an anti-rationalist. But in order to assign their final meaning, the critics have had to erect a rigorous boundary between

reason and nature. This has had the overall effect of limiting the meaning of the text. It is my purpose in this study to try to breach the line of distinction between reason and nature, show this line as an "economic" boundary rather than a "frontier," readmit the excluded argument, and thus open up possibilities for other meanings as the present one becomes only a beginning.

I

Let us begin then by citing from Björk's essay a passage that is most explicit in setting out the terms of this opposition between the head and the heart in *Desperate Remedies*:

In the conflict between the head and heart in the novel, the heart is always at a disadvantage. No matter what the antagonistic side is called — Understanding, Judgment, Brain, Common Sense, Intellect, or Head — it is constantly supported by the economic, social, moral, and religious principles of modern civilization. (Björk 1976: 98).

A little earlier, Björk had stated that *Desperate Remedies* mildly rejects society's economic values owing to the cramping effect these values have on human emotions, especially on love. And from his overall treatment of this subject in which he finally establishes Hardy as an anti-rationalist, it is clear that the heart and the emotions belong to the order of nature while the head and its variant terms just listed are cultural traits. Here then, is the opposition between nature and culture, or the irrational and the rational. And since the irrational is represented, or read, as the underdog, Björk has every reason to label Hardy an anti-rationalist.

Let us mildly point out here that this distinction between head and heart is but a guise for the separation of two extremes of the same principle. Philosophy thrives on such distinctions. Here, the distinction between head and heart, as is obvious from Hardy's works such as *Tess* and *Jude* and of course *Desperate Remedies*, rests on activity and passivity, the best model of which is found in Spinoza. Spinoza's distinction between the states of human bondage and of freedom is purely a distinction between passivity and activity. For Spinoza, when the body's affections are confused and mutilated, the affection in question is a passion. At such moments behavior is confused or irrational and the mind is passive. Both when the ideas are clear and distinct, the affection is action: behavior is straightforward, the mind active. Therefore, for Spinoza, liberty coincides with perfectibility, that is, with greater knowledge and harmony. This is how he puts it in one of his commentaries:

... the power of the mind is defined by knowledge only, and its infirmity or passion is defined by the privation of knowledge only: it therefore follows, that that mind is most passive, whose greatest part is made up of inadequate ideas, so that it may be characterized more readily by its passive states than by its activities: on the other

hand, that mind is most active, whose greatest part is made up of adequate ideas, so that, although it may contain as many inadequate ideas as the former mind, it may yet be more easily characterized by ideas attributable to human virtue, than by ideas which tell of human infirmity. (Spinoza 1974: 393)

It is fairly obvious that passivity and activity belong to the same principle, same in difference. All through Spinoza's classification of the emotions, for example, he insists that almost every single vicious emotion can be converted to an equivalent virtue simply by having adequate knowledge of such emotions: this enables the individual to govern and transform them to positive affections. This governing of the emotions through adequate knowledge and judgment transforms the individual from a state of passivity and bondage — slave to the emotions — to a state of activity and freedom, a state of perfection. This is why irrespective of the fact that thinkers throughout the ages have consistently kept passion and reason as separate and opposed faculties, it is evident, in the final analysis, that both belong to the same principle in Spinoza's schema; thus, Spinoza differs from Descartes, for example, who classifies all affective behaviours as passive.

This brief reference has served to show the rationalists' stance in the opposition between reason and emotion, activity and passivity. Evidently, passion or state of passivity (or all affective behaviors for Descartes) belong to the raw, unbridled, untamed nature, a state of "privation" or "infirmity", while reason or a state of activity or knowledge belongs to a higher faculty. As can be expected, then, in the opposition between passion and reason, reason is the privileged term. Hardy, as his critics have pointed out, will argue against this and try to reprivilege passion by representing it as the dominant trait of human behavior.

But Hardy's argument for the dominance of passion in human behavior is not as simple as his critics present it. Hardy saw the human situation as ironic in its resistance to all simple-minded rational strategies. For him, life cannot be reduced to cut and dried rules. Hence, early in *Desperate Remedies* the narrator poses the question, "What is Wisdom really?" and answers immediately, "A steady handling of any means to bring about any end necessary to happiness." (Hardy 1960: 17). This has all Hardyian ironic ring to it. For Wisdom here simply means worldly wise: a wealthy position in life, and we know happiness means much more than what material wealth can procure. The implication here, then, is that any systematic grand plan to achieve a particular end necessarily compromises something else, the absence of which makes our success but a mockery. If the art of pure love is what we aim at, we fail to acquire the financial security that will make it thrive in the social set up, and vice-versa. Hence the narrator tells us:

It is a melancholic truth for the middle classes, that in the proportion as they develop, by the study of poetry and art, their capacity for conjugal love of the highest

and purest kind, they limit the possibility of their being able to exercise it — the very act putting out of their power the attainment of means sufficient for marriage. The man who works up a good income has had no time to learn love to its solemn extreme; the man who has learnt that has had no time to get rich (Hardy 1960: 49)

For the moment, let us observe that love, which is opposed to the cultural element in the above passage, is not entirely natural; it is at least partly learned, perfected, through "the study of poetry and art;" this blurs the distinction between culture and nature; or makes the reading of the text as distinction between culture and nature insufficient.

It is not to be doubted, though, that for Hardy the norms of society are inimical to natural laws or individualism. For him, the social norm has the overall effect of making the individual a converger: whatever the individual's idea of greatness is founded on has to conform to what is acceptable within the mores of the society. This is the paved road for those who aspire to greatness. But Hardy saw this as the way of the mediocre. As far as society is concerned there is nothing wrong with mediocrity: in fact, it is the rule rather than the exception since societal norms suppress the diverger in the interest of conformity. For Hardy, there is another sure path to greatness — the thorny path of solitary individualism, the way of the diverger who breaks the borders and constraints of the paved road to admit the usually excluded. In a short exchange between Edward Springrove and Cytherea following the former's confession of his humble beginning and delayed success in life, the true nature of greatness, in Hardyan sense, is established:

'And if you should fail — utterly fail to get that reasonable wealth,' she [Cytherea] said earnestly, 'don't be perturbed. The truly great stand upon no middle ledge; they are either famous or unknown.'

'Unknown,' he [Edward] said, 'if their ideas have been allowed to flow with a sympathetic breadth. Famous only if they have been convergent and exclusive' (Hardy 1960: 49)

Here the opposition is expressed in terms of the rational laws of society against the natural inclinations of the individual. Once again, the natural, described as radicalism, may never see the light of day.

As many critics have pointed out, this disadvantage of the natural in the social setting is better represented by Hardy in terms of the emotion of love. Natural love is represented again and again in Hardy's fictional world as blissful, that is, before rationalization sets in. In fact, rationalization spoils the thing for the lovers. Therefore, one cannot help feeling a nostalgia for the Edenic love, a pre-reflective stage of love relationships. As we are told:

Perhaps, indeed, the only bliss in the course of love which can truly be called Eden-like is that which prevails immediately after doubt has ended and before reflection has set in — at the dawn of the emotion, when it is not recognized by name, and before the consideration of what this love is, has given birth to the consideration of what difficulties it tends to create; when on the man's part, the mistress appears

to the mind's eye in picturesque, hazy, and fresh morning lights, and soft morning shadows; when, as yet, she is known only as the wearer of one dress, which shares her own personality; as the stander in one special position, the giver of one bright particular glance, and the speaker of one tender sentence; when, on her part, she is timidly careful over what she says and does, lest she should be misconstrued or under-rated to the breadth of a shadow of a hair (Hardy 1960: 43)

It is necessary at this point to introduce a word that occasionally surfaces in Hardy's texts, either explicitly or implicitly, in a double role: the word is "imagination." In fact, without imagination the Edenic love just described cannot even begin. All that makes love blissful is the power of imagination to seize on certain first impressions of the loved one, idealize them, and make them synonymous with him or her. Here, then, imagination positively aids natural love, enhances, and sustains its source. Yet, it is this same imagination that excites reason, which in its perverted form as represented in the case of Angel Clare, transgresses itself and becomes inimical to natural love. It is imagination therefore, like the proverbial house divided against itself, that sustains the opposition between the head and the heart. But let us follow Hardy yet further.

This inimical working of imagination against love is exemplified by Miss Aldclyff's success in making Cytherea doubt for a moment the genuineness of her love for Springrove. Miss Aldclyff, for some hidden motives, has just unfolded the wiles and fickleness of men's love which makes women's steadfastness pitifully simple-minded; this enables Cytherea to see her own love transport as the work of imagination and she breaks down:

... She was at last driven to desperation: her *natural common sense* and shrewdness had seen all through the piece how imaginary her emotions were — she felt herself to be weak and foolish in permitting them to rise; but even then she could not control them: be agonized she must. She was only eighteen, and the long day's labour, her weariness, her excitement, had completely unnerved her, and worn her out: she was bent hither and thither by this tyrannical working upon her imagination, as a young rush in the wind. She wept bitterly. (Hardy 1960: 96) (emphasis mine)

Let us observe here in parenthesis that "Common Sense" which is put down in our opening citation as a cultural trait is described above as "natural," and we shall soon see that reason itself has a natural origin. And returning to the trend of our argument we shall join Cytherea in saying it is "cruel" to be helped in this way to unveil all one's feelings as the working of the imagination.

It is imagination that largely makes love fragile. Hardy seems to have been cautious of his language when he terms the early stage of love "Eden-like." For Eden condition having been lost is lost forever to humanity especially in terms of its pure love. We need no tenuous argument to prove this: let us just note that in Eden there were only a man and a woman, no complication of alternative partners, no economic considerations as in modern societies. "Eden-like" love is therefore fictive, a product of imagination ephemeral and

symptomatic of the desire for the ideal that is deferred. We have the impression of the ephemeral nature of this imaginative love from the description of the sensation of Springrove/Cytherea's first kiss. This kiss ends almost abruptly. While they were still in reverie, their hearts still doubting the "evidence of their lips," Springrove hints at some thing that had prevented his kissing Cytherea till that moment. And as we are told, "Cytherea's short-lived bliss was dead and gone [instantly]. O, if she had known of his sequel would she have allowed him to break down the barrier of mere acquaintance-ship — never, never!" (Hardy 1960: 52). Although Springrove does not reveal the facts of his previous engagement at this point, the hint remains a blight to fuel imagination on the negative side. Moreover, any love that is substained by pure imagination will sooner or later be destroyed by the slightest intrusion of reality.

We have thus far located the opposition between head (reason) and heart (passion) in the distinction between activity and passivity; we have also noted that neither is love entirely natural, nor common sense, and perphas reason too, entirely cultural; and also, we have seen the double role of imagination which helps to sustain this opposition. These facts suggest that the opposing terms share some "sameness" in their difference, and that any attempt to rigorously differentiate between them will be open to occasional contradiction. Consequently, we have come to feel that the treatment of the terms as simply opposed is not sufficient to account adequately for the relationship between the terms. Hence, we must seek another model to help us see in full perspective the behaviors within the relationship. The structure of supplement, a structure of difference,¹ recommends itself at this moment of need.

II

We shall begin this section by expressly deferring the definition of "supplementarity" and promising to give it at the "end" of the section, the end which could be the beginning, the end, which, in this essay, is a middle. Meanwhile, we shall establish a need, nature's need for supplement as can be extracted by an inclusive reading of this story. Such a reading will put in our forefront the promise of "sameness" in difference, and of aid and displacement in the relationship between culture and nature, and by implication, head and heart, reason and natural love.

All complications that threaten the course of natural love in Hardy's fiction suggest that nature cannot stand alone unaided to guarantee the highest form of love in the human situation. For example, there should be moral

¹ "Differance" or difference is Derrida's coinage that signifies, as in French "differer," both spatiality, to differ, and temporality, to defer. It will hereafter be used without quotes or accent, and inter-changeably with the English spelling. NB. Differance is neither a word nor a concept.

laws (a cultural element) to prevent men like Edward Springrove and Mr. Manston from entering into new love relationship with Cytherea while they were still engaged or married to another woman. Negligence of such moral principle is responsible for Manston's tragedy as he gets caught in the mesh of immoral relationships, resorts to subterfuge, murder, and suicide to escape the law; it is also responsible for the delay of the union between Cytherea and Springrove, as Cytherea's suspicion of Springrove's unfaithfulness makes her succumb to Manston's insistent marriage advances, much against her will. Only moral principles, be they of natural or institutional origins, can make the course of love smooth.

Conversely, to argue that individuals should be free to get in and out of wedlock without the constraint of social law, as in *Jude*, is to confirm, on the one hand, the ephemeral nature of natural love, and on the other, negate its possibility in the social setting. For every dissolution of marriage marks an absence or want of natural love, the true love that does not alter in the worst of conditions. This very absence, or lack, is the very need for nature to be supplemented. What is lacking might just be material need, which could be supplied within the cultural set up: or lovers' constancy, which moral laws aim at preserving. Culture then can help nature to achieve its end.

Hardy was quite aware of the need for culture to supplement nature in the course of natural love. Just as he saw clearly that material needs alone cannot guarantee and sustain love, he also knew that natural love without material guarantee is a mockery. We get this suggestion from the description of the sordid living conditions of the Higgins, conditions typical of the poor in the cities, which is capped by the following commentary:

Of all the ingenious and cruel satires that from the beginning till now have been stuck like knives into womankind, surely there is not one so lacerating to them, and to us who love them, as the trite old fact, that the most wretched of men can, in the twinkle of an eye, find a wife ready to be more wretched still for the sake of his company (Hardy 1960: 351).

One might argue that the case of the Higgins show that a family can survive on sheer natural love. But what a way to survive: "A baby crying against every chair-leg, the whole family of six or seven being small enough to be covered by a wash-tub"! This remark must remain a strong, unmistakable undertow of whatever argument we raise to support the sufficiency of natural love. And this seems to be Hardy's point. One of the terms (nature and culture) is not sufficient by itself.

For Hardy, then, it can be claimed that nature unaided by culture will come to self-destruction: it is clearly represented in the Higgins' cause just cited; Jude's destruction and Sue's survival suggest it in *Jude the Obscure*; Ethelberta's successful "contrivances" to save herself and family from their humble circumstances hints at it in *The Hand of Ethelberta*; and Manston's uncontrol-

lable passion for women which leads to his destruction implies it. But these presences are non-simple. If the reader of each of these works does not see the need for nature to be supplemented as a positive argument, it is present as the erased opposite, ever strong, as the constant threat of the sword of Damocles, or as the "shimmering" ghost that threatens all our arguments to the contrary.

Hardy's argument concerning the head and the heart, therefore, can be said to be governed by the structure of supplementarity, one of the structures that reveal difference. Simply put, supplementarity is a movement of difference in which that which is irreducibly lacking, or becomes lacking, gets augmented by something that is same but not identical with it, or something that fills in for it and thus defers its presence. For example, the replacement of the thing by the sign, a replacement that is necessary in the irreducible absence of the thing for re-presentation, is a supplementarity of origin, a make-up for the non-presence at the point of origin. Thus, the sign in its relationship with actual presence — the thing-in-itself — is one of supplementarity; it tries to add to the idea of this presence by representing one form of it by dissimulation. This addition to the idea of the thing results in prolongation. Also, by being same but not identical with the thing, the sign, and indeed every relationship of supplementarity, allows disjunction by this radical inclusiveness; thus, supplementarity is economy. However, a supplement can become "dangerous" when it completely effaces that which it was supposed to augment. This is what happens when rational laws (reason) replace natural laws (emotion) in society. This is then the structure in which Hardy's social criticism is better seen, the structure of supplementarity.

In fact, the distinction between culture and nature, or rather their relationship, is better accounted for as supplementarity. Derrida's comment on a passage from Rousseau's *Emily* (1911: 323) about natural love, instinctive restraint and morality is very illuminating on this subject and I quote at length:

It is clearly confirmed that the concept of nature and the entire system it commands may not be thought except under the irreducible category of the supplement. Although modesty comes to fill the lack of a natural and instinctive restraint, it is, nonetheless, as a supplement, and moral as it certainly is, natural. This product of culture has a natural origin and a natural end. God Himself has inscribed it in His creatures: "The Most High has deigned to do honor to mankind; He has endowed man with boundless passions together with (natural) reason by which to control them. Woman is also endowed with boundless passions; God has given her modesty to restrain them." Thus God gives reason to supplement natural inclinations. Reason is thus at once within nature and in a supplementary role to nature; it is a supplementary ration. Which supposes that nature might sometimes lack something within itself. And God even adds a bonus (*praemium*), a recompense, a supplement to the supplement; "Moreover", Rousseau continues, "he has given to both a present reward for right use of their powers, in the delight which springs from that right use of them, i.e., the taste for right conduct established as the law of our behavior. To my mind this is higher than the instinct of beasts. (Derrida 1974:180)

Among other things, it is clear from this passage that those traits usually identified by Hardy's critics as cultural and destructive to the natural, if considered deeply, have natural origin and natural ends. Since adequate provisions have been made for man's survival, such that what is lacking in one faculty, if it cannot be supplied within that faculty, is augmented by another faculty that is same with it in difference, there can no more be a real "frontier" between such faculties as reason (head) and passion (heart). Rather than a strict boundary, what we have is a transitional zone of "economic distribution" between such faculties, a zone of endless interaction and inclusiveness, of delay and hesitation (marked by the "a" of difference), with the possibility of back and forth displacement. Hence it is wrong to see social laws as simply opposed to nature. For social laws are well-meaning, aim at augmenting nature. However, when they miscarry and play the "dangerous supplement" it is because their good intentions have transgressed themselves, become too active, and so render the faculty they were supposed to aid passive. A reversal of this threatening situation is also possible within the back and forth movement from activity to passivity.

III

Having thus established the fact that human faculties are in supplementary relationship among themselves and with their cultural counterparts, an inclusive type of relationship, we shall now consider this relationship in terms of its economy of life. And we must once again have recourse to Derrida's interpretation of Rousseau. For Derrida, Rousseau made no secret of the fact that nature needs the supplement of culture. In the Fifth Book of *Emily*, as Derrida perceptively notes, modesty is defined as a supplement of natural virtue in women. Women need modesty, the moderation of their sexual passion, in order not to drag their men to their death by sexual over-indulgence. And contrasting women with their lower animal counterparts. Rousseau writes:

The desires of the animals are the result of necessity, and when the need is satisfied, the desire ceases; they no longer make a feint of repulsing the male, they do it in earnest. They do exactly the opposite of what Augustus' daughter did; they receive no more passengers when the ship has its cargo ... Instinct both drives and stops them. *But what would take the place of (supplement) this negative instinct in women if you rob them of their modesty?* To wait for them not to concern themselves with men, is to wait for them to be good for nothing. (And this supplement is indeed the economy of men's lives): Their natural intemperance would lead them to death; because it contains their desires, modesty is the true morality of women. (Derrida 1974: 179–180)²

This economy of life which Rousseau has expressed in terms of women's modesty and men's lives has a more general reference in the world of Hardy's novels. For example, in *Desperate Remedies* the secrets of the morally debased

² Cf. also Rousseau 1911: 322–333.

Manston, whose passion for women has landed him in a tangle of marriage ties, must be unearthed, morality re-established, before there can be any meaningful union between Springgrove and Cytherea; in *Under the Greenwood Tree* (Hardy 1977), understanding and moral restraint have to be exercised by all those concerned in the quadrangular love to ensure the survival of the two passionate lovers, young Dewy and Miss Fancy Day: hence, Mr. Day, to avoid frustration and death of the lovers, rescinds his objection to the union: the Vicar, Mr. Maybold, learning of the engagement of the young lovers promptly withdraws from the race for Fancy: and Dewy by sheer steadfastness wins Fancy from Farmer Shiner, resolving thus the love tangle and saving the lives of the two true lovers; in *A Laodicean* (Hardy 1963), the reprehensible craftiness of Mr. Dare, who unscrupulously distorts Mr. Sumersert's image to further his father's marriage suit with Paula Power, must be gotten out of the way before the much desired marriage between Paula and Sumersert can take place: only after then can the couple dispassionately watch the castle, which is a medieval intrusion into the present, erased by fire. Conversely, in *An Indirection in the Life of an Heiress* (Hardy 1976), where cultural elements are unrelenting as exemplified by Squire Allenville's barring the unequal union between his daughter, Geraldine, and Egbert, Geraldine, as a last minute effort to avoid marriage to Lord Bretton, must escape, get secretly married to Egbert, and die shortly afterwards to avoid facing her uncompromising father... All these point to the fact that economy of life depends on cultural (moral) supplement of nature. Without this supplement, nature will come to self-destruction.

Perphas, this need for the moral supplement of nature in the human situation is what some of Hardy's critics have called altruism. Virginia Riley Hyman, for example, has noted that man's natural desire for happiness, which is at bottom egocentric, is what ultimately destroys him. For Hyman, Hardy's solution to the human dilemma is altruism: a man should not seek for personal happiness, but how best to survive as a social being: "His self-consciousness is a stage beyond his former unconscious participation in the group, valuable in providing heightened self-awareness, but unless accompanied by [supplemented with] an equally heightened awareness of others, is ultimately self-isolating and self-destructive." (Hyman 1974: 186). All this is quite true. But what Hyman has done is reject both terms of the oppositions (Science/religion, reason/feeling, past/present) and project a third choice open to man, that is, altruism. And one may like to ask whether altruism is not a moral norm. If it is, can one be wrong, then, to say, it is a supplement to man's natural desire for happiness and survival?

The tangle of Hardy's argument is better seen in his diagram of the human tree, a diagram purported to be his interpretation of Fourier (Björk 1974: 2-3). Although it is not my intention to offer a detailed interpretation, which is in fact impossible, it appears as if Hardy saw the human tree as rooted in hu-

manity and wished to emphasize that man must stand or fall by the variables of the social soil. Hardy in the diagram has three divisions of the human psychic — Passion, Intellect and Will, the intellect being the adviser of the other two. All through Hardy's work, as already noted, imagination, a function of the intellect, appears again and again in its double role as the condition for the Edenic love as well as the root for its perversion through the medium of reason. It is imagination that awakens both the passions and reason but quickly transcends itself resulting in idealization in both faculties. This function of imagination makes it the common denominator of the faculties in Hardy's schema, holding their possibility for perfection as well as perversion. For Hardy, therefore, each of these faculties cannot stand by itself and still be a true son of humanity. For an exclusive dominance of each gives rise to a Monster; hence, we have the "Impossible Monster of the Passions," of the Will, and of the Intellect. For example, we see the "Impossible Monster of the Passions" in Jude, of the Will in Henchard, and of the Intellect in Angel.

Growing out of the soil of humanity, passion or Will or intellect, each by itself, will not come to full potential except through the mediation of imagination. This awakening of the faculties to their possibility of perfection as well as perversion is also the link with death. However, there is the advisory function of the intellect in the form of "natural" reason (see citation on page 9), common sense, and understanding which are supposed to be beneficent — indeed, virtues that God has inscribed in the human soul as Rousseau would put it — and ready to supplement for any lack in the individual in human situation.

Ideally, this arrangement of supplementarity should result in a balance in the individual. For Hardy, however, equilibrium is rare in any particular individual, and remains, as the ideal, ever in view but deferred. The man who is dominated by passion (Jude) scorns reason to die embittered against his marker; the man who is dominated by strong Will (Henchard) abandons reason to come to a defiant ruin; conversely, the man who is governed by cold logic (Angel) defers all emotions, flings nine-tenths of his happiness to the winds, and wastes a wife's life. Nature, or culture, each by itself, is not just enough, Hardy seems to say. Natural virtues unbridled, unsupplemented turn vices. Society steps in to further supplement nature by moral laws. But, somehow, natural reason gets completely displaced in society's well-meaning intention to help nature achieve its end. This is how the cruel states of social conventions that Hardy's characters protest against, protest that Björk and other critics have properly documented as proofs of Hardy's anti-rationalism, came to be. But these arguments and protests are no more than *mise en scene* and Hyman is right when she points out that:

Greater familiarity with Hardy's 'evolutionary meliorism' and with the sources [?] from which he derived it suggests that the above conflicts [between science and

religion, reason and feeling, past and present] are more fictional than real, that the dichotomies are deliberately constructed as a means of suggesting a third [?] position, a position he regarded as superior to either: the ethical one. (Hyman 1974: 181)

That the terms of the arguments are fictional constructs we agree no less with Hyman, but we shall continue to question the idea of "sources", and of course, we have been trying to show that what she calls a "third" position is a call for moral supplement that will make for economy of life.

From what some of his critics who hold contrary views say it is even clear that what Hardy suggests is not entirely a new state. Let us take another passage from Hyman, for example, and follow her with some attentiveness:

For Hardy, the answer to the question of how man was to live in a universe devoid of significance and value was clear. The solution for Hardy was not metaphysical but moral. Precisely because the universe offered no moral direction, man was to make [or supplement by making] his own. Because there is no divine providence looking after us, we must [supplement and] look after ourselves. And if we are to save ourselves we must learn to save each other: [for nature has already provided us with instincts for our individual survival, but, as social beings, we must supplement them since our very survival depends on certain social imperatives — in short, morality, or call it altruism.] (insertions mine). (Hyman 1974: 179)

If Hyman is right in interpreting Hardy this way, we cannot be wrong in reading her (Hardy?) as saying there is a lack at the point of origin, some potent absence like the vacuum of the thermos flask that needs the stopper to accomplish its end of maintaining the temperature within the bottle. The vacuum and the stopper, in their difference, work from a common end.

Hardy might have bumped his head time and again against this vacuum in his search for reality. He, no doubt, felt the pain of this absence, an absence that is as hard and impenetrable as the repellent invisible wall of astral energy. In his cry of need, of emotion and desire, Hardy inscribed the name "humanity" within this vacuum, this felt absence of the "Other," this absence that is the thing. Humanity here means much more than the concept of man posited in pure nature; it is all-inclusive; it admits of all the cultural determinants of a human need for survival. Here, then, nature and science... may find a common substance. Thus we grant Hyman's idea of altruism with qualification: that altruism does not become exclusively a collective consciousness for then it runs the danger of "theological collective perfectionism;" the individual element must be present in it in some form, in other words, the best in nature and the best in culture hold the possibility of man's survival. By expressly positing in Hardy's concept of "humanity" both the elements of nature and culture, we move toward a sort of structural counterpoint; this, we shall explore in greater detail in the next section.

IV

As we follow the trend of Cytherea's process of reaching a decision about the choice of a partner, we seem to be moving toward a counterpoint in the opposition between head and heart, or culture and nature. This counterpoint is what most critics who see this novel as an anti-rationalistic argument ignore in their attempt to erect a strict boundary between reason and nature. Unfortunately, Cytherea's argument does not fit into such rigorous distinction.

Cytherea Graye stands out clearly as one of Hardy's best representations of the conflict between the head and the heart, not because she is wholly successful, fully-drawn and enduring character, but because it is in her characterization that the distinction between head and heart shows clearly as polemical hair-splitting. A careful review of her argument will reveal that all the cultural elements — products of reflective reason — are in supplementary relationship with the individual's natural traits. This very fact is what blurs the distinction between culture and nature, head and heart, and, in Cytherea's case, makes it difficult for her to reach a decision whether or not to accept Manston. The mental confusion incidental to this difficult choice is faithfully captured when Manston, for the first time, takes Cytherea's hand in his, and she hesitates whether or not to withdraw it:

Thinking, and hesitating, she [Cytherea] looked as far as the autumnal haze on the marshy ground would allow her to see distinctly. There was the fragment of a hedge — all that remained of a 'wet old garden' — standing in the middle of the mead, without a definite beginning or ending, purposeless and valueless. It was overgrown, and choked with mandrakes, and she could almost fancy she heard their shrieks Should she withdraw her hand? No, she could not withdraw it now; it was too late, the act would not imply refusal. She felt as one in a boat without oars, drifting with closed eyes down a river — she knew not whither (Hardy 1960: 255).

We observe here the shorelessness of a mind in turmoil. Literally and rhetorically the hedge that could provide limited view by exclusion has broken down in decay, now "without a definite beginning or ending," and from its overgrown mandrakes come indistinct echoes. Withdrawing her hand would no longer mean refusal. We are indeed on dangerous grounds of distinction and making ourselves understood when our very actions, not to mention words, start to mean their very opposite. We would, indeed, say with Prufrock in Eliot's "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock," a poem which at one level of reading is about the problem of language: "it is impossible to say just what I mean!"

This trap of distinction thickens as Cytherea starts to realize that just as her common sense (reason) direct that she marries Manston, her natural impulse gravitates in the same direction. Finding that her reasons (reflective)

to marry Manston seem to coincide with her impulse to be kind, she tells us:

To marry this man was obviously the course of common sense, to refuse him was impolitic temerity. There was reason in this. But there was more behind than a hundred reasons — a women's gratitude and her impulse to be kind (Hardy 1960: 254).

Thus, we find, contrary to what many conventional critics think, that "common sense" here cannot simply be considered a cultural element that is opposed to nature. For Cytherea's favor for Manston at this point of time does not result from purely social and economic considerations; natural inclination has to do with it also. This fact becomes obvious when we realize that common sense is an endowment: it belongs to the intellect which plays an advisory role in Hardy's chema. This makes common sense a kind of natural reason "given to advise" (supplement) the passions. But it is also a cultural element, and as supplement to natural reason, therefore, serves a natural end. The same goes for the "hundred reasons", all of which are in supplementary relationship with the "impulse to be kind," an impulse that needs the supplement of natural and/or reflective common sense (reason) for its perfectibility. In such supplementary relationship as we have been talking about, the opposition between the terms does not simply disappear, rather, the terms become obviously same in difference, and recognizable as effects of the play.

The gap between reason and passion begins to narrow more and more as Cytherea begins to identify her reasons for accepting Manston with some specific sources — natural needs. Her consideration of the kindness of one of her lovers against the fickleness of the other is a case in point. By this comparison, she comes to see how much Manston's kindness to her ailing brother and to herself is an evidence of love that makes Edward's fickleness all the more conspicuous. Hence, as Cytherea hesitates whether or not to withdraw her hand from Manston, she thinks, "How truly pitiful it [is] to feel his hand tremble so — all for her." One can almost use the Rousseauist idea of "pity" as the source of the imperative natural love to read this line. For here it is reason in both senses, natural and cultural, that advises Cytherea not to break her heart for a fickle lover, and leaves her open to imagination which touches off the natural cord of pity for Manston. And we may modify Shelley here and say, if there is pity can love be far behind?

But this kind of love arising from the natural cord of pity is not always ideal; it could be a dangerous supplement too. Its danger can be inferred from Sue's reason for marrying Phillotson in *Jude the Obscure*:

... sometimes a woman's love for being loved [Hardy's italics] gets the better of her conscience, and though she is agonized at the thought of treating a man cruelly, she encourages him to love her while she doesn't love him at all. Then when she sees him suffering, her remorse sets in, and she does what she can to repair the wrong. (Hardy 1965: 191)

And Jude nails the point when he tells her, "You simply mean that you flirted outrageously with him, poor old chap, and then repented, and to make reparation, married him, though you tortured yourself to death by doing it." It can be claimed, then, that a dangerous supplement for love comes from nature too.

One can infer from the dire circumstances that condition Cytherea's decision to marry Manston that nature and culture are eternally conjoined in a supplementary relationship. It is true that Cytherea has no spontaneous love for Manston. Yet, Manston is just the man she needs to generate the desperate remedies for the crying needs that have made her life and her brother's miserable. They could not be anything else but miserable after the sudden death of their almost improvident father. Their needs have just reached the point of desperation with Owen's confinement to the wheelchair: bills piling up, creditors becoming impatient. Manston and his mother, Cytherea's benedactress genuinely desire the union between him and Cytherea, and are willing to alleviate the Grayes' financial burden. Manston has already provided Owen with a wheelchair, and stood surety for his debts, all in the effort to win Cytherea's love. From the economic stand-point, from social standpoint, from common sense and understanding, Manston is the right choice if Cytherea wishes to overcome her present problems.

Cytherea knows, however, there is something in her mightier than the "brain" that guides her to choose Manston: natural passion. And her natural passion is for Edward Springrove. But because Edward is in dire circumstances himself as well as fickle, social and economic reason dictates against this union. Here, then, natural love lacks something in the social condition, a need to be supplemented, so that nature will not come to self-destruction. In a letter to her sister, Owen urges her to marry Manston but ends with a cautionary remark: "Don't go against your heart, Cytherea, but be wise." Which, then, is the "wise" course in Cytherea's predicament? We shall follow her debate at this moment of crisis at great length:

But she considered; in the first place she was a homeless dependent; and what did practical wisdom tell her to do under such desperate circumstances? To provide herself with some place of refuge from poverty, and with means to help her brother Owen. This was to be Mr. Manston's wife.

She did not love him.

But what was love without a home? [i. e. nature unsupplemented by culture] Misery. What was a home without love? Alas, not much; but still a kind of home [where culture becomes a dangerous supplement]

'Yes,' she thought, 'I am urged by my *common sense* to marry Mr. Manston.'

Did anything nobler in her say so too? [i. e. something in supplementary relationship with reflective reason].

With the death (to her) of Edward her Heart's occupation was gone. Was it necessary or even right for her to tend it and take care of it as she used to in the old time, when it was still a capable minister?

By a slight sacrifice [supplement] here she could give happiness to at least two hearts whose emotional activities were still unwounded. She could do good to two men whose lives were far more important than hers.

'Yes,' she said again, 'even Christianity urges me to marry Mr. Manston.' (insertions and emphasis mine) (Hardy 1960: 257).

And as the narrator further tells us, Cytherea becomes persuaded that some "heroic self-abnegation" was necessary in this matter, and so she lapses into a "wilful indifference" regarding this indifference as what "guishing natures will do under such circumstances, [and] as genuine resignation and devotedness." The course of wisdom, therefore, lay in this decision of reason, or of the brain, a decision that will always be threatened every time Springrove appears and her passion, in spite of all her defenses, tries to overthrow her reason.

Moreover, it is important to note that Cytherea ends up in "indifference" — passivity — in a decision of reason. This is perhaps Hardy's way of reversing the rationalists' schema. For the rationalists, all decisions reached through adequate knowledge are active as in all cases of judgment of "reason." But Cytherea after considering all the known facts of her case, except what nobody knew — Manston's past — decides to marry Manston. By all standards, this decision is active. Yet, her acceptance of the results of this active judgment is made through passivity. Here again is a blurring of the distinction between reason and heart, activity and passivity, a blurring that can only be understood within the deferral structure of supplement.

What seems to have taken place in this act of decision-making is that Hardy has made activity coincide with passivity. The decision to marry Manston is a sublimation of passion for Springrove. Therefore, this marriage will be lacking in natural love which is now deferred by reason. Reason, then, plays a dangerous supplement to nature as it becomes the condition for this union. That is to say, the active principles of reason are in supplementary relationship with the passive principles of nature, both of which principles can then be said to be working for a common end.

It can further be demonstrated that Cytherea's decision to marry Manston, for all her rationalization, is in another sense an extension of the passive principles. This fact becomes obvious when we remember that she had to get out of herself, make the happiness of "two hearts" (Manston and her brother's), neglect her own emotions in order to accept Manston. But this love for the "two hearts" outside hers has a natural source, which brings her active reasoning to a counterpoint with the passive principles of the heart.

On the surface level of the story this counterpoint between activity and passivity, and by implication, culture and nature, reason and passion, is obvious. Cytherea loves her brother Owen naturally and wants to be good to him

in particular, and to humanity in general. Her marriage to Manston for economic and social, that is, cultural reasons, will help her fulfill this natural end. This attempt to fulfill a natural end by cultural means makes Nature and Culture same in difference. This sameness, of course, is only understandable under the category of supplementarity. It is only this structure that reveals both feeling and understanding, which conventional critics have always seen as opposed, in a mutual role; it is only this structure that shows reason as both natural and cultural, and also shows its limitation within the fixity of concepts; it is only this structure that reveals clearly the double role of imagination in Hardy's schema as the opening to the possibilities of both perfection — bring the ideal within sight — and also perversion through idealization.

This relationship of supplementarity exposes the limitation of seeing altruism as Hardy's solution to the human dilemma. It is true that Cytherea's choice of Manston, neglecting self for the happiness of all, is altruistic. But, is this choice of Manston not in some sense selfish? If it is, then we are caught in an apparent contradiction within the term "altruism." One suspects that altruism might harbor within itself its own transgression. For example, Cytherea's choice in one sense is as selfish as it is selfless in another sense. It is selfish because every marriage decision based on material gains is immoral and essentially selfish. Many of Hardy's critics who talk about his antirationalism or his criticism of the institution of marriage will agree with this view; they will agree that it is a perversion of natural reason to marry for money even if the money is to be put to charitable use. All the same, we have already seen from the reasons previously given that Cytherea's decision is selfless, and is redeemed from egotism by the fact that she hurts herself in order to please "two other hearts." And, of course, we also know that while she is trying to save these two hearts she is also neglecting two other hearts — hers and Springrove's. It is again only under the structure of supplements that we can adequately account for this double play of selfishness and selflessness embedded in an altruistic choice. This persistence of the opposite is made possible by the "trace".

No matter what philosophical schemata we are working in, as we move from the *eidōs* — the zone of almost photographic images, the zone within which love for the opposite sex may be apodictically determined as originating from the heart (nature) — to the *telos* — the world of ends and normativity — we find that the *eidōs* progressively cease to be essence. Progressively too, ontic determinations become demystified and the concept of "horizon" is replaced by structure and essence. In this movement of temporalizing, structure is collapsible, and when it does collapse, a "return to the eidetic is possible." This possibility of a return is ensured by the "trace," the persistence of the *eidōs* in the *telos* in the structure of difference. It is this collapse of structure that reveals to Cytherea that, after all, her love for Maston, on the face value, eco-

nomically determined, is not entirely without spiritual determination: "even Christianity urges me to marry Mr. Manston."

Finally, it has to be stressed that Cytherea's marriage to Springrove after Manston's death by suicide also reveals culture as a supplement of nature. It is true that this marriage to Springrove is based on natural love; but it is also supported by the inheritance Cytherea gets from Miss Aldclyffe, in the final analysis. For although Cytherea rejects all inheritance coming to her through her marriage with Manston, the couple's means of livelihood is derived from her benefactress' estate on which Springrove works with the liberty of an owner. After the three possible inheritors — Cytherea, Mr. Raunham and the Crown — had each refused the estate, Mr. Raunham accepts it but lets Springrove run it, and, as the story closes, Clerk Crickett intimates:

And a settlement had been drawn up this very day, whereby their children [Cytherea and Springrove's], heirs, and cetera, are to inherit after Mr. Raunham's death. Good fortune came at last [to supplement nature]. (Hardy 1960: 452).

Indeed we must say with Crickett that good fortune has come at last to supplement their natural love and guarantee their happiness and survival in the social setting.

But all this is a representation of a representation, the story but an image apart from the thing which is always left behind, and my account but a multiplication of the image. We must therefore say with Crickett to the reporter from the *Casterbridge Chronicle*: "That's the married man and wife — there", as Cytherea and Springrove appear, "I've illustrated my story by real liven specimens". But while Crickett considers his job done, ours is but a loosening of a few joints of meaning to show the impossibility of our task.

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