

## THE STATUS OF PRESCRIPTIVISM IN SOCIOLINGUISTICS

AGNIESZKA KIELKIEWICZ

*Adam Mickiewicz University, Poznań*

In the first half of the twentieth century, when linguistics was categorically declared an essentially descriptive discipline, the status of linguistic prescriptivism began to be continually questioned. Since then the dichotomy of the descriptive and the prescriptive in linguistics has given rise to a heated controversy. Prescriptivism has often been considered 'unscientific' as its commands (and not statements) have been understood to result from prejudice and individual fancy and take the form of linguistic prescriptions (and not descriptions).

Today, after a period in which the descriptive dominated, prescriptivism seems to be recovering its significance. This is partly due to the improvement of its analytical tools. The reappraisal of the prescriptive attitude to language has also been caused by the developments in descriptive linguistics. The shift from the study of language as an isolated system to the study of language in its social context has made the problems of prescriptivism suddenly more relevant to linguistic research (and vice versa).

In the present article we attempt to reassess linguistic prescriptivism from the positions of sociolinguistics. Our point of departure is the tentative claim that insights from sociolinguistics are of crucial importance to any linguist representing the prescriptive outlook on language study. We believe that the sociolinguist's and the prescriptivist's views are not incompatible and we will try to show how a reconciliation between them may be worked out.

### *Confrontation*

Throughout the history of linguistics up to the twentieth century prescriptivism had been the underlying idea behind the study of language. The rise of prescriptivism should probably be related to certain features of language itself.

It is perhaps important to realize that each time certain meaning is to be expressed, language provides a number of alternative ways to do it. This kind of redundancy characteristic of language is the main premise of the existence of linguistic prescriptions. The idea of the prescriptive approach to language rests on the assumption that out of many alternative forms — which are claimed to be liable to evaluation and judgement — only one is appropriate to be selected and used, while all the others should be condemned as 'incorrect' or 'corrupted'. The necessity to choose the right solution calls for an authority which would guarantee the proper judgement of linguistic forms.

In view of the considerable amount of diversity manifested by language use, prescriptivists set out to regulate language by settling disputed points of usage. Advocating the use of a more or less uniform linguistic code (i.e. reducing variation to a minimum) they hope to optimize communication in a natural language. The perfection of social communication, understood as the speaker's ability to put his thoughts into linguistic form in the most adequate way, is the principal aim of prescriptive linguistics.

The major criticism of the prescriptive approach to language derives from the position defined by what might be considered the axiom of contemporary linguistics: the true aim of linguistics is exploration in the facts and description of language (whatever its essence is conceived to be). The normative approach is based on the assumption that linguistic facts may be objectively evaluated. From the point of view of descriptive linguistics, the procedure of making value judgements over linguistic forms has no place in any academic inquiry into language. That is why most descriptive linguists discard prescriptivism as unscholarly; it substitutes — they claim — unscientific (i.e. subjective, intuitive, arbitrary, prejudiced) values, prescriptions, commands for scientific facts, descriptions, statements.

Of course, it would be unfair to accuse prescriptivists that they base the decisions as to which form is acceptable and which is not on their personal preferences, on guesswork or prejudice. For centuries they have been seeking to devise a set of criteria which would provide for objectivity of the evaluation. In general, however, these criteria have been justly criticized by descriptivists as none of them proved an efficient tool in assessing linguistic forms.<sup>1</sup>

The developments in the twentieth century linguistics have placed linguistic prescriptivism outside the field of interest of most linguists. The modern view of language change is one of the most important factors that have made the prescriptive attitude almost redundant; once linguistic change ceased to be perceived as constant degeneration and debasement of language, it seemed no longer necessary to safeguard and propagate the 'pure' and the 'elegant'

<sup>1</sup> For a discussion as well as criticism of standards of correctness see: Jespersen 1925, Pooley 1946, Hubbell 1957, Haugen 1966, Greenbaum 1975, Rubin (ed.) 1977.

in language. Another reason why the majority of the early twentieth century linguists treated questions of correctness as immaterial was simply that they were preoccupied mainly with the system of language abstracted from its actual realization in a speech community.<sup>2</sup>

Sociolinguistics has provided a new perspective to the study of language. It does not dismiss differences in usage as irrelevant because for the sociolinguist they are crucial points of interest. In the belief that "in order to understand the nature of language it is necessary to start from considerations of its use" (Halliday 1978: 52), sociolinguists observe language as it is actually used in everyday communicative situations. What emerges in the course of the observation is linguistic diversity resulting from the fact that "means of speech are what their users make of them" (Hymes 1974: 204). The very diversity is made the core of sociolinguistic research.

The ways in which the sociolinguist and the prescriptive linguist approach language seem to converge considerably. Both are concerned with language as social behaviour of a non-ideal speaker observable in a heterogeneous speech community. Aware of the fact that "it is common for a language to have many alternate ways of saying the same thing" (Labov 1972: 188), both take special interest in the linguistic options at the speaker's disposal, yet each considers a different aspect of the matter and for a different reason. The sociolinguist deals with what speakers do with the options; he describes their choices and attempts to find out what conditions their language decisions. The prescriptivist, on the other hand, subjects differing linguistic forms to evaluation and formulates linguistic precepts to be followed by speakers.

Sociolinguists take issue with this very procedure. Two alternative language forms — they argue — constitute two linguistic facts. The only thing the linguist does is describe and record them; under no circumstances would he exercise any judgement over them for he neither has tools for making such judgements nor is it his aim to make them. Nevertheless, evaluation of linguistic forms does take place. It results in normative precepts issued by prescriptivists but also in people's subjective reactions to the speech of others as well as the assessments of their own language. This is how sociolinguistics explains the origin of these evaluative attitudes. People exploit the resources of language in different ways. The pattern of the exploitation is precisely what the sociolinguist wants to discover — the social distribution of linguistic items. The regularities manifested by this distribution indicate that what makes two words (pronunciations, constructions, etc.) different are, among other things,

<sup>2</sup> This approach may be illustrated by the quotation from de Saussure: "the true and unique object of linguistics is language studied in and for itself". (Saussure 1916 232). As for later times, problems of divided usage never bothered transformational-generative linguists; for the purpose of their research, they conceived of a speech community as homogenous and a speaker as an ideal user of his language.

the social values attached to them in the process of social interaction by means of language. Thus, one form is preferred to another for reasons of social prestige and not because of some intrinsic 'wrongness' of the latter form.

Apart from being grossly different, in some sense sociolinguistics and linguistic prescriptivism seem to run counter to each other. Namely, the normative approach is aimed against language diversity which is precisely the main concern of sociolinguistics. Quite often, diversity is blamed for faulty communication and is, therefore, designed to be reduced to a minimum. (cf. Haugen 1962; Rubin 1977). We will consider in the latter part of the paper why the sociolinguist deems this approach untenable.

There is yet another aspect of prescriptivism that has received severe criticism from sociolinguists. The normative tradition is accused of producing social attitudes which cause linguistic insecurity and bring psychological harm to these speakers, or groups of speakers, whose speech is officially declared to be inappropriate, deficient or even illogical. Labov (1969) has protested against the verbal deprivation theory, the conclusions of which may be damaging for the linguistic consciousness of underprivileged social groups. He considers it intolerable that black children should suffer the effects of the theory which classifies them as incapable of logical thinking or even mentally retarded only because they use a non-standard language variety. Similar objections have been levelled at Bernstein's theory of 'restricted' and 'elaborated' codes. (Bernstein 1971).

It seems that the theory of verbal deficiency of non-standard speakers, though constructed by linguists, has its roots somewhere in the contentions of prescriptivism. The stigmatization of non-standard language varieties arises in the process of negative social values associated with certain speakers being ascribed to the language these speakers use. The sociolinguist puts the blame for such confusion on the mistaken assumptions and the propaganda of prescriptivism. Can such grave accusations be rebutted?

### *Reconciliation*

#### *1. The Sociolinguist and the Social Demand for Linguistic Prescriptions*

Because of serious flaws in the theoretical foundation of language prescription<sup>3</sup> (notably the misconception of the notion of value in language as well as the lack of agreement as to the criteria of correctness), prescriptivism has not been able to tackle its tasks efficiently. It has rightly been criticized for its conceptual failures and blamed for deepening the linguistic insecurity of

<sup>3</sup> We mean 'the theoretical foundation of language prescription' (as opposed to the practice of the actual propagation of the proscribed forms) to comprise the major premises, assumptions and aims of prescriptivism as well as a set of criteria used to fix standards of correctness.

some speakers by means of unfounded arguments. However, in spite of the criticism, every linguist must agree that it is not reasonable to renounce prescriptivism altogether. Admittedly, the need for normative pronouncements is evidently real in any speech community and no linguist would refuse to recognize the social utility of prescriptive linguistics.

The speaker who wants to express himself in language faces a multiplicity of solutions from which he has to choose the kind of linguistic policy which best serves his intentions. Confronted with such choice, he often suffers from what is called by Haugen (1962) 'schizoglossia' — a conflict which arises in the speaker who has at his disposal more than one way of linguistic expression and is uncertain as to which form he ought to use. Such a speaker needs the assistance of prescriptive linguists. School teachers or handbook and dictionary authors are confronted with a constant demand for authoritative pronouncements on language; they look for criteria on which to base their selection of variants. Recently created states need guidance in the establishment of national standard languages. On the other hand, already established standards call for the elaboration and refinement of their capacities (e.g. new terminology). Finally, published material needs to be printed according to a uniform orthographic system. All these various requirements create an extensive social demand for the assessment of value in language and promotion of the preferred forms. It is for prescriptive linguists to satisfy this persistent demand.

Descriptive linguists have long been treating issues of language correctness as not pertaining to their research. Therefore, they have often been accused of promoting extravagant and undesirable permissiveness in language use. In most cases these accusations are unfounded — the linguists are far from stating that the social value of all linguistic forms is the same and thus everything that the speaker utters is correct and acceptable under any social circumstances. It is simply that many linguists are not at all interested in what is socially acceptable in language.

Due to the change in the approach to language (brought about with the rise of sociolinguistics) the position of the linguist in relation to 'correct' and 'incorrect' speech needs to be redefined. It is no longer possible for the linguist to pass over socially stigmatized forms declaring them to be as good as others. "The scientific position is to recognize that the problem exists, that it needs research and study in terms of social goals and that mere toleration is not really a remedy". (Haugen 1962: 154).

#### *2. The Sociolinguist and the Diversity-Uniformity Issue*

Presumably, sociolinguistics, with its preoccupation with language as a means of social communication, provides the most appropriate theoretical basis (i.e. descriptive and explanatory material) for the prescriptive linguist

to lean on. However, in those points where sociolinguistics and the normative approach are contradictory, there are substantial doubts to be resolved before the findings of the former could be applied for the purposes of the latter. The attitude towards diversity in language is certainly one of the issues: while the sociolinguist makes it the focus of inquiry, the normativist sets out to act against it.

The main argument of prescriptivism against variation in language is that it hampers communication and may even prevent intelligibility (cf. Rubin 1977). As the goal of linguistic prescription is to optimize communication, the prescriptivist would obviously try to remove diversity as undesirable and harmful. The sociolinguist, on the other hand, is far from disqualifying diversity.<sup>4</sup> Sociolinguistic descriptions and explanations indicate that it is not possible to get rid of variation in language because it results from — and reflects — all kinds of social and geographical differences between speakers and whole speech communities. Obviously, these differences are essential attributes of every human society and are unlikely to become eradicated by any action. Variation is also perpetuated by differential social attitudes to language.

From the study of language and social life (at its present stage) the sociolinguist may conclude that variation is determined by factors beyond any control and any attempt to eliminate it inevitable ends in failure.<sup>5</sup> By this claim he could explicitly condemn prescriptivists for aiming to eliminate language variation, were this really their aim; however it is not. Most prescriptivists only want to shape variation by influencing the course of language development from which it derives. Therefore, they are not so much interested in the amount of diversity present as in questions of what kind of diversity is permissible for communication to be unimpeded. Deliberate control of the ways people use their language is the main task of prescriptivism. The question now arises how the sociolinguist may find the task justifiable and sensible enough to contribute to its execution.

<sup>4</sup> Labov, for example, rejects the view that "the unchanging, homogenous speech community ... is the ideal towards which we should be striving, and that any degree of heterogeneity subtracts from our communicative powers." (Labov 1972: 274). He is rather of the opinion that "the development of linguistic differences has positive value in human cultural evolution." (Labov 1972: 324).

<sup>5</sup> Certainly, there are not only centrifugal but also centripetal tendencies in language. Therefore, the fear that constant and uncontrolled development of language will eventually result in complete incomprehensibility is much exaggerated. The need for communication will always force people to keep their language reasonably uniform. (Hall 1960).

### 3. The Sociolinguist and Language Errors

Certainly, the sociolinguist would acknowledge that mutual intelligibility is the necessary condition for an act of communication to take place. Different linguistic variants meet the requirement of intelligibility in different ways, depending on the particular social context in which they are applied; in some cases variation may be responsible for partial, or even complete, incomprehensibility. In these cases the reduction of variation seems to be the only remedy which could help retain reciprocal understanding. The sociolinguist would accept such corrective schemes which are clearly designed to guarantee optimum understanding between interlocutors.

In order to explain in what sense and why sociolinguistics could justify the normative action against diversification in language, we propose to contrast two aspects of language correction, each referring to a different kind of mistake. 'Incorrect' linguistic constructions may be divided into two types on the basis of the criterion of intelligibility:

A. these that essentially are understood as the speaker intends but are deemed incorrect because they bear unfavourable social connotations; e.g. English '*I ain't got no money*' or Polish '*My byli na czasach*'.

B. these that are condemned because they cause misunderstanding or imprecision so that they either prevent or considerably impede intelligibility; instances of such erroneous constructions are:

- tautology
- pleonasm
- mixed metaphor
- faulty use of words of foreign origin
- lack of differentiation between words whose meanings differ only slightly.

The 'mistakes' of type A, though stigmatized by some social groups, do not bring any serious disturbances into the process of communication. They have little, if any, bearing on the precision and clarity of the information being transmitted. The errors of type B, on the other hand, produce perplexity and lead to misinterpretation of the speaker's intentions.<sup>6</sup>

The sociolinguist, when involved in the problems of language normalization and cultivation, would justify the correction of type B errors only. He would admit that the aim of the prescriptive cultivation approach to obtain harmony between thought and linguistic forms used to transmit it is hardly

<sup>6</sup> In many cases the borderline between the two types of errors is hardly perceptible. For instance, a non-standard form may belong to both type A and type B, depending on whether its meaning is known in the community which uses the standard variety.

questionable. The errors that disturb this harmony and deform the speaker's intention must be eradicated, even at the expense of variation. In this single pursuit the sociolinguist would support prescriptive linguists, whatever the aims of his own research.

Type A constructions, on the other hand, being no hindrance to intelligibility, are likely to persist because there is no strong reason for speakers to abandon them. The attempt to eradicate them is thus neither justifiable nor feasible. The condemnation of these forms by linguists means that they acknowledge and support the social stigmatization of non-standard forms for only social reasons and no others. By labelling non-standard linguistic items as 'incorrect', prescriptivists follow subjective social attitudes to language and use their academic authority to perpetuate and institutionalize social prejudice against the underprivileged. Sociolinguists will definitely never subscribe to such practice.

#### 4. *The Sociolinguist and the Norm*

In view of the criticism that sociolinguistics has brought against the prescriptive approach to language, the notion of the norm, the main construct of prescriptive methodology, should be reformulated. There is no agreement among prescriptive linguists about correctness in language. Numerous disputes as to what criterion should be given priority over others have never reached any conclusion. Perhaps the only answer to this problem is that the norm is in no sense absolute. Therefore, for the norm to promote only uniformity is just as undesirable as to allow for unlimited diversity. As Haugen has observed, "language does not merely serve as a means of cooperation but also as a means of individual expression. The first leads to uniformity of code, the second to diversity. The actual result has to be some kind of balance between the two". (Haugen 1966: 171). Thus, the norm should be flexible enough to account for the two needs of the speaker (i.e. linguistic cooperation as well as individual expression) and provide both for uniformity and diversity in language. The norm can only satisfy this condition when its creators have access to extensive information about a speech community: the extent of diversity there is, the speakers' attitudes to variant forms, the points where communication is impeded or precluded.

The primary concern of normative linguists should be to create a set of linguistic models based on a more valid foundation than just individual preference or social prejudice. Apart from the detailed sociolinguistic description of available language data, this foundation should include a criterion that would fix the standard of correctness. From the point of view of sociolinguistics, the criterion of usage is the most appropriate and valid because it is the least arbitrary and the closest to social reality. Besides, it naturally

dominates all other possible criteria which, without its sanction, are not valid. (Social acceptance, manifested in usage, is indispensable for any normative precept to have meaning.) It is, however, questionable whether this criterion really provides authoritative answers to problems of language choice in society. The question of whose usage is the highest authority still awaits resolution.

Since the social acceptance of the norm is never likely to be uniform (because of differing social values), relativity must be made one of the major characteristics of the norm. Correctness is always relative to some variety of language considered standard. Thus, for instance, dialectal forms are 'incorrect' within the standard variety. Similarly, however, standard expressions may be considered inappropriate when used in a regional dialect.

Though the prospect of achieving the satisfactory formulation of the norm seems rather distant, sociolinguistics certainly gives several useful hints to the norm makers.

*Firstly*, it provides evidence that the legislation of the norm is only one of the factors shaping the standard. Certain usages, however, even if contrary to the norm, will remain as established by the majority of speakers, no matter how great the condemnation which they may receive from prescriptive grammarians. *Secondly*, normalization is not likely to succeed if it means 'uniformation' because diversity is as inherent (and indispensable) in language as is uniformity.

*Thirdly*, before he can prepare the norm, the normative linguist has to test social attitudes and reactions to language carefully in order to find out what is socially accepted and what is likely to become accepted. This information also shows how quickly the attitudes change and proves that the updating of the normative pronouncements is crucial.

*Fourthly*, according to sociolinguistics, different language forms (varieties) should be viewed as linguistically equivalent; they are 'better' or 'worse' only in the social sense. Thus, to accept legislation on language automatically means to agree to legislation on preferable social values.

#### 5. *The Sociolinguist and Language Evaluation*

Having illustrated the relevance of sociolinguistics to linguistic prescriptivism, we are still left with the question of whether the sociolinguist should directly involve himself in language evaluation. The negative answer to the question would imply that he may only provide knowledge necessary for the establishment of linguistic precepts. The sociolinguist himself, however, does not take part in the actual decision-making and its practical implementation.

The other possibility, which answers the above question positively, assumes "the potential role of the linguist in codifying norms and giving them the

sanction of authority." (Haugen 1966: 159). According to this viewpoint, the sociolinguist is entitled — or even obliged — to make value judgements of language, using his linguistic knowledge to confirm their validity. In this case he adopts "a position of 'enlightened prescriptivism' based on evidence from empirical observation." (Bell 1976: 227). He is a representative of what could perhaps be given the label of 'applied (i.e. prescriptive) sociolinguistics' — a discipline in which knowledge about the social aspect of language use is applied to devising specific linguistic policies to be enacted in a speech community in order to obtain optimum efficiency of linguistic expression.

It is debatable which of the two positions of the sociolinguist is better justified from the points of view of both the sociolinguist and the prescriptivist. What ought to be confronted here are the specific prescriptive linguistic tasks on the one hand, and the present state of sociolinguistic research on the other. Is sociolinguistics able to cope with the problems of efficiency in language use (whatever is meant by 'efficiency') and to satisfy the demand of society in this respect? In this matter we are inclined to share the opinion of Jernudd who expressed his scepticism in the following way:

Even if we assume that there are better and worse languages, and that linguists should seek a more efficient state of language — do we know enough to develop criteria that can tell us what efficient language is? We know very little about the structure and use of language; and we know very little about people's thoughts, likes and dislikes, about language. The conflict between a linguistically-based 'ideal' language planning and an empirically-based problems-of-speech-communities language planning demonstrates that a linguist's view of language and his vision of beauty of language constitute but one aspect of social and linguistic reality: people do indeed have different opinions about their own and others' language. (Jernudd 1973 as quoted by Grucza 1983: 443).

Whether sociolinguistic knowledge is abundant and accurate enough to constitute the basis for making prescriptive decisions is one problem. Another is whether it is sufficient for prescriptive linguists to draw from sociolinguistics only. It seems that, at least for those involved in language planning, it is not. According to Haugen (1966), preparing language policies for whole societies requires not only information from linguistics but also insights from political science, anthropology, sociology and psychology as well as contributions of aestheticians and philosophers. It is also questionable whether representatives of the cultivation approach to language<sup>7</sup> could rely on insights

<sup>7</sup> The terms used above, language planning and language cultivation, refer to two kinds of normative activity. The first, operating on a macro-scale, concerns such problems as the selection of a national standard, its codification and propagation; provision of new terminology or orthography. The other, planned on a micro-scale, relates to deliberate cultivation of a language which aims at refinement and elaboration of means of speech. (cf. policy approach and cultivation approach — Nostupny 1968).

from sociolinguistics alone. In many cases of linguistic forms whose correctness or appropriateness is problematic, sociolinguistics is not in the position to provide proper solutions (for instance, how could the sociolinguist solve the problem of multiple negation?). Therefore, of the two positions of the sociolinguist suggested at the beginning of this section the former is, in our opinion, more reasonable.

### Conclusion

In the above discussion we have attempted to redefine the linguist's attitude to prescriptivism. We have expressed the opinion that the linguist, especially the sociolinguist, can hardly ignore problems dealt with by normative linguists because these problems derive from the complexities of the social use of language, i.e. directly from the sociolinguist's major field of interest.

A close examination of prescriptivism reveals considerable flaws in its assumptions. In some cases sociolinguistics proves necessary to remove these inadequacies. Insights from sociolinguistics enable the prescriptivist to realize what lies behind the evaluative judgements of linguistic forms and sociolinguistic descriptions help him make the judgements more adequate. In fact, he cannot work without making reference to sociolinguistic knowledge.

After considering the possible adoption of the prescriptive position by the sociolinguist, we reject the notion of 'prescriptive sociolinguistics' and with it the idea of sociolinguistics as the suitable frame within which contemporary prescriptivism should function. Our decision is motivated by the still limited capability of sociolinguistics to provide society with ready linguistic prescriptions. Besides, we have pointed to problems which indicate that sociolinguistics and the prescriptive attitude are in some respects contradictory.

In general, though sociolinguistics will not provide the prescriptive linguist with solutions to his problems, undoubtedly, he will benefit a lot from studying the discipline.

### REFERENCES

- Bell, R. T. 1976. *Sociolinguistics: Goals, Approaches and Problems*. London: Batsford.  
 Bernstein, B. 1971. *Class, Codes and Control*. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.  
 Dean, L. F. and Wilson, K. G. (eds). 1959. *Essays on Language and Usage*. New York: Oxford University Press.  
 Fishman, J. A., Ferguson, Ch. A., Das Gupta, J. (eds). 1968. *Language Problems of Developing Nations*. New York: Wiley.  
 Giglioli, P. P. (ed.). 1972. *Language and Social Context*. Harmondsworth: Penguin Books.

- Greenbaum, S. 1975. "Language variation and acceptability." *TESOL Quarterly* 9. 165—172.
- Grucza, F. 1983. *Zagadnienia metalingwistyki. Lingwistyka — jej przedmiot, lingwistyka stosowana*. Warszawa: PWN.
- Hall, R. A. 1960. *Linguistics and Your Language*. New York: Doubleday.
- Halliday, M. A. K. 1978. *Language as Social Semiotic. The Social Interpretation of Language and Meaning*. London: Edward Arnold.
- Haugen, E. 1962. "Schizoglossia and the linguistic norm." In Haugen, E. 1972. 148—158.
- Haugen, E. 1966. "Linguistics and language planning." In Haugen, E. 1972. 159—190.
- Haugen, E. 1972. *The Ecology of Language. Essays by Einar Haugen*. Selected and introduced by Dil, A. S. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Hubbell, A. F. 1957. "Multiple negation." In Dean, L. F. and Wilson, K. G. (eds). 1959. 279—281.
- Hymes, D. 1974. *Foundations in Sociolinguistics. An Ethnographic Approach*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Jespersen, O. 1925. *Mankind, Nation and Individual from a Linguistic Point of View*. London: George Allen and Unwin.
- Labov, W. 1969. "The logic of non-standard English." In Giglioli, P. P. (ed.). 1972. 179—215.
- Labov, W. 1972. *Sociolinguistic Patterns*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.
- Nestupny, J. 1968. "Some general aspects of 'language' problems and 'language' policy in developing societies." In Fishman, J. A. et al. 1968.
- Pooley, R. C. 1946. "Historical backgrounds of English usage." In Dean, L. F. and Wilson, K. G. (eds). 1959. 259—265.
- Rubin, J. 1977. "Language standardization in Indonesia." In Rubin, J. et al. (eds). 1977.
- Rubin, J. et al. (eds). 1977. *Language Planning Processes*. The Hague: Mouton.
- de Saussure, F. 1916. *A Course in General Linguistics*. English translation by Baskin, W. 1959. New York: Philosophical Library.