

A SEMANTICALLY BASED APPROACH TO LANGUAGE
DESCRIPTION AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT
ON THE TEACHING OF FOREIGN LANGUAGES

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I

In spite of extraordinary intensification and expansion of scientific language studies in our century, especially in the past three to four decades, the problems of how to approach the description of the phenomena of language most effectively can by no means be said to have been solved already. This holds true of the description of the grammar of concrete individual languages as well as that of 'pairs' of languages aimed at, for example, in 'contrastive structure studies' or 'contrastive grammars', the main concern of which is to discover and systematically represent interlanguage commonalities, similarities, and differences between a particular native language and a certain target language.

The procedures of linguistic description followed in the various approaches may, on the one hand, be judged from purely linguistic aspects, mainly from the point of view of the adopted linguistic theory in general. They may, on the other hand, — especially if it concerns research in the field of applied linguistics (in language teaching), as in the case of contrastive — syntactical, phonological, or other — analyses or similar projects — also be examined from the point of view of the utility or applicability of the particular descriptions to the solution of practical problems of teaching and learning the languages under consideration.

Both aspects, linguistic theory and the practical teaching of foreign languages, will — as far as this is possible within the limitations of the space available — be taken into account in the present contribution.

If one leaves the so-called 'traditional' or 'conventional scholarly gram-

mers' out of consideration here and restricts oneself to the more recent approaches to the phenomena of language that have met with a great response in linguistic circles, one may, with some justification, describe all of them — whether behaviourist-oriented taxonomic structuralist linguistic analyses or descriptions along the line of the so-called 'standard theory' of transformational generative grammar as initiated by Noam Chomsky — as syntactically (or, at least, non-semantic) based approaches to grammar.

All of them centre attention primarily on the formal — syntactic or phonological — properties of linguistic utterances, their phonetic or syntactic form, or, in other words, on the study of utterances as 'syntactical units', 'syntactic structures' or 'sound structures', whether physically manifest or 'superficial' or of the more abstract, 'deep' or 'underlying' kind.

The earlier of the two major directions in the study of grammar, 'structural descriptions' or 'descriptive structuralist grammar', professedly restricted its representation mainly (if not exclusively) to 'outer' "linguistic forms... of independent utterances" (Fries 1952: 23) as "syntactical unit[s]" (Fries 1952: 31) or "formal patterns of sentences" (Fries 1952: 36) and expressly rejected "the using of meaning as the basis for ... grammatical analysis" (Fries 1952: 55). It was, as is widely acknowledged today, obviously beyond the scope of its possibilities (and, admittedly, outside the intentions of its initiators) to adequately describe what essentially contributes to making human languages what they are, namely the fact that all of them provide the means for expressing one's thoughts in a variety of ways or, to quote structuralists such as Charles C. Fries themselves, for putting "the same content ... into a variety of linguistic forms" (Fries 1952: 19), and allow for it that "derselbe Gedanke in verschiedenen Sätzen ausgedrückt werden" kann, "ebenso wie der gleiche Satz zum Ausdruck verschiedener Gedanken dienen kann" (Wygotski 1964: 301).

To illustrate this briefly, synonymy at the sentence level is found, for instance, in cases like

- (1) (i) US helicopters have flown more Saigon regime troops from South Vietnam to Cambodia
(ii) Pilots of the US armed forces have flown more Saigon regime troops from South Vietnam to Cambodia by helicopter
- (2) (i) This room has three windows
(ii) There are three windows in this room
- (3) (i) It seems to me that Jack resembles Peter
(ii) I have the impression that Jack bears resemblance to Peter
(iii) (According) to my mind Jack is similar to Peter
(iv) I think that Peter and Jack are similar (to each other)
- (4) (i) John may have gone to London (by car)
(ii) It may be that John has gone to London (by car)

- (iii) It is possible that it is true/the case that John has gone to London (by car)
- (iv) I consider it possible that (it is true that) John has gone to London (by car)
- (v) It $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{may be} \\ \text{is } \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{possibly} \\ \text{perhaps} \end{array} \right\} \end{array} \right\}$ true that John has gone to London (by car)
- (vi) John has $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{possibly} \\ \text{perhaps} \end{array} \right\}$ gone to London (by car)

Sentence (4) (i) (as well as others of this group) may, at the same time, serve as an illustration of what is sometimes called homonymy at the level of the sentence. For example, it leaves open the question of whether John has gone to London alone and as driver or with somebody else driving the car.

Chomsky-oriented studies of language of the 'classical' transformational generative kind, in their attempts to overcome apparent inadequacies or inherent limitations of preceding structural descriptions, have, since the publication of *Syntactic Structures* in 1957, directed their efforts towards penetrating more deeply into non-observable layers of language and setting up 'deep' or 'underlying' syntactic structures. In spite of notable advances beyond the limits of descriptive structuralist approaches, however, the limitations of the classical transformational generative approach themselves have become more and more apparent in recent years. Thus it seems highly doubtful today whether even a 'revised' "standard theory" of transformational generative grammar will ever enable linguists to tackle fully those problems whose solution was entirely out of the reach of descriptive structuralists.

It is true, of course, that the 'standard' transformational generative theory does not principally bar the way to associating meaning with ('deep') syntactic structures, and thus markedly distinguishes itself from descriptive structuralism. In its representations of the 'meaning-form relations', however, the standard theory assigning priority or centrality to deep structures to be generated in the syntactic component, adopts a 'deterministic' view hardly suited to adequately reflect the complicated character of these relations.

According to this theory, the deep syntactic structure of a sentence is "the abstract underlying form which determines the meaning of a sentence" (Chomsky 1966: 57). "The underlying structure ... determines the semantic content" (Chomsky 1965: 15ff). It "expresses those grammatical functions" (Chomsky 1968: 26) and "relations ... that determine the meaning of a sentence" (Chomsky 1968: 26) or "play a central role in determining the semantic interpretation".

Descriptive adequacy will, in our opinion, however, scarcely be attainable without recognizing "the dialectically contradictory character of the

interrelatedness of syntactic and semantic structures" (Berndt 1971 : 6) and thus acknowledging the fact that "linguistic signs and thoughts are indissolubly linked with one another, but this linkage is dialectically contradictory" (Klaus 1965 : 330; translated from German).

Apart from — essential — implications with regard to the adequacy of the theoretical foundations of such approaches to language description, it seems to us that factors such as the impossibility of taking the dialectically contradictory character of the content-form relations fully into account also negatively influences the applicability of the results of such descriptions to language teaching purposes.

Facts such as these, that one and the same judgment, for example, may be expressed in differently structured sentences, that there are a number of ways in which we can transfer a thought to others, or that many different sentences may have the same meaning content while, on the other hand, one and the same syntactic structure or pattern may very well permit conveyance of a number of relationally different semantic structures (cf. Berndt 1971 : 18), or that the same sentence may be used to say quite different things, can obviously not be completely ignored in foreign language teaching either.

In our opinion, what reduces the 'usefulness' of grammatical descriptions giving precedence to 'outer' or 'inner' syntactic construction over semantic organization for language teaching purposes or makes their 'optimality' questionable, at least, is, amongst other things, this very same fact, so often adduced as an argument against semantically oriented approaches, that "the same meaning content can be put into a variety of linguistic forms". What impairs their value for practical teaching and learning purposes but is absolutely inevitable in grammatical descriptions of the descriptive structuralist kind, namely the separation of language phenomena in neglect of semantically relevant connections between them, on the one hand, and, on the other, the subsummation of what from the point of view of semantic relationships are widely differing phenomena purely because of formal syntactic sameness or similarity, will, as far as we can see, to some — probably not inconsiderable — extent not be avoidable for transformational generative grammar either.

2

One of the major objectives of foreign language teaching (FLT) is obviously to develop 'communicative competence' ('Kommunikationsfähigkeit') in the learner to an extent "which matches, at least in part, that of native speakers of the language to be learned" (Ritchie 1967 : 68). In other words, what FLT aims at, is, foreign language mastery to an optimally high degree, unthinkable without the development of mental abilities, and first and foremost the ability to use the foreign language for communicative

purposes, or communicate effectively in the FL, also called 'Sprachbefähigung', 'linguistic ability' or 'capacity' for the production and perception of maximally many utterances in the language to be learned, i.e. "not the mere ability to mouth the utterance ..., not the mere ability to understand the utterance", capability not only of "saying and understanding ... but saying with understanding" (Newmark 1966 : 223ff).

Somewhat more explicitly we might, perhaps, say that what FLT has to achieve is to enable the student to express his thoughts, convictions, his feelings and emotional state, etc. in the foreign language, to realize his "intention[s] of getting something over to somebody else, modifying his behaviour, his thoughts, or his general attitude toward a situation" (Thorne 1967 : 68) etc. as well as to understand messages communicated by other speakers of that language.

Linguistic research with the objective of supplying results of optimal 'utilizability' for the practical teaching of foreign languages cannot, in our opinion, be reduced to viewing language as 'language per se', 'language as form or structure', but will, in accordance with the above mentioned goals of FLT, have to attribute essential importance to the so-called 'communicative — informative' function ('kommunikativ-informative Funktion') of language.

Such an approach to the phenomena of language will, therefore, of necessity, have to differ from that of N. Chomsky, for example, who expressly denies the importance of this function for linguistic theory: "It is wrong to think of human use of language as characteristically informative, in fact or intention. Human language can be used to inform or mislead, to clarify one's own thoughts or to display one's cleverness, or simply for play. If we hope to understand human language and the psychological capacities on which it rests, we must first ask what it is, not how or for what purposes it is used" (Chomsky 1968 : 62).

Separating 'human language' as 'linguistic structure' or 'a structural system' — partially or entirely — from 'human use of language', or attempting to study it in isolation from the basic question of 'how and for what purposes it is used' means, at the same time, severing its connexions with all other "intellectual and practical-concrete activity in society"¹, or, at least, blurring these connexions, passing over the social character of language, the fact of its being socially conditioned, and taking no account of the "social nature of the human essence as the basis both for the emergence of his linguistic ability and for his actual use of language" (ZISW 1972 : 25).

In view of these facts we are inclined to give preference to conceptions

¹ ZISW 1972: 22 (this and the following quotations from ZISW 1972 have been kindly translated from the German original by my friend and colleague, Mr. P. M. Plant, M. A.).

according to which "for us the system of language ... has no existence detached from the actual use of language. Rather, it is a totality of regular and law-governed features and characteristics of language use which are objectively connected with, and related to, each other"². Both sides of this activity—indissolubly linked with, and in, language—'cognitive' or 'mental activity' (by which we here understand reflections in the mind of non-verbal as well as verbal states of affairs, i.e. perception of linguistic utterances) and 'communicative activity' are obviously to be considered as two sides of an essentially social activity "in which individuals and social groups control and regulate their behaviour reciprocally, the control and regulation taking place by way of (human) consciousness" (ZISW 1972 : 6) and "important mediating, co-ordinating, planning and guiding functions are carried out" (ZISW 1972 : 25).

Language teaching with the aim of enabling the learner to perform communicative activity in the second language, in our opinion, needs linguistic descriptions in which especial consideration is paid to language in its capacity as the prime medium of exchanging messages in society, as a historical product, a "medium of exchange ... created by and for society" (Bolinger 1968 : 300) or "a means through which interaction between human beings takes place" (Smith 1969 : 90) or "without which ... significant social intercourse is hardly possible" (Sapir 1970 : 25).

However, according to N. Chomsky himself, this is no concern of the 'standard theory' of transformational generative 'grammar', neither is it of descriptive structuralist representations. It obviously requires attempts at approaching the study of language from another, different angle.

3

With regard to the subject matter of grammatical description we fully share the view according to which "the theory of grammar examines the totality of language but examines it from a special abstractional point of view ... the semiotic The subject matter of the theory of grammar comprises the organization and structural composition of each of the two sides ... (the components and organizational relations) of the cognitive contents and (the components and organizational relations) of their possible forms of utterance ... in relation to the organization and structural composition of what in each case is the other side, ... the laws to which the

² *ibid.*, p. 16. The original version is "Das Sprachsystem hat für uns keine von der wirklichen sprachlichen Tätigkeit abgeordnete Existenz. Es ist vielmehr eine Gesamtheit von regelmässigen, gesetzmässigen Zügen und Merkmalen der sprachlichen Tätigkeit, die objektiv miteinander verbunden und aufeinander bezogen sind".

reciprocal relations between the content and forms of ... utterances conform"³.

Confronted with the problem of what to consider the units forming the basis of grammatical description, it is useful, perhaps, to remember that the 'communicative competence' to be developed in the learner in foreign language teaching is often, somewhat generally, defined as the ability to understand and produce utterances in this language. What is meant here by 'utterance', 'linguistic utterance' or 'language-utterance' is a sort of 'communicative unit', occasionally described as the "smallest operational unit on the level of meaningful continuous discourse" (Leont'ev 1970 : 333; translated from Russian) in the sense of a number of successive, or a sequence of, utterances exhibiting a larger or lesser degree of contextual cohesion, a 'basic unit of communication'.

In view of the apparent impossibility of achieving anything like a 'grammar of discourse' ('Textgrammatik') in the near future, it seems reasonable to us, for the time being, to keep within the limits of the linguistic utterance for descriptive purposes, too, and to regard it as the most adequate unit from which to start our description.

In referring to the linguistic utterance as the basic unit of description we are primarily guided by matters of content, by the character of the 'utterance' as — at least, minimally 'closed' — 'message' or, in other words, a linguistic unit capable in itself, that is without any 'supporting' contextual or other situational factors, of bearing a certain information content or 'Sinngehalt' or suited alone to express a thought. (We are fully aware of the definitional problems connected with precisely determining the limits of what constitutes an 'utterance' but do not, at present, consider definition the task to be fully solved before any further steps can be taken.)

In a similar way, at least, K. Ammer calls the „abgeschlossene Äusserung“ as „sprachliche[s] Ganze[s]“ „eine ... höhere ... Leistungseinheit der Sprache ... , in der die Vorstellungskonstellation des Sprechers dem Gesprächspartner erschlossen wird“ (Ammer 1958: 64ff).

What also has a bearing upon questions concerned with putting the description into practice, is obviously the possibility of further differentiation

³ ZISW 1972: 9 ff. The original version is "Die Grammatiktheorie betrachtet das Ganze der Sprache, sie betrachtet es aber unter einem speziellen Abstraktionsgesichtspunkt ... , [den] semiotische [n] ... Den Gegenstand der Grammatiktheorie bilden die Gliederung und der Aufbau jeder der beiden Seiten ... die Einheiten und Beziehungen der Gliederung der Bewusstseinsinhalte [und] die Einheiten und Beziehungen der Gliederung... [ihrer] möglichen Äusserungsformen ... in bezug auf Gliederung und Aufbau der jeweils anderen ... , die Gesetzmässigkeiten des gegenseitigen Bezugs zwischen Inhalt und ... Formen ... der Äusserungen".

between 'simple', 'elementary', or 'minimum' complete utterances on the one hand, and 'complex' or 'expanded' utterances (sometimes also called 'modification structures') serving mental reflections of 'complex' or 'complicated' states of affairs, on the other.

The relevance of this distinction for practical teaching purposes remains valid, in principle, in spite of the apparent existence of limits to the splitting up of communicative units into 'elementary' complete utterances which cannot be exceeded in ultimately practice-oriented descriptions without reducing rather than raising their practical value, but for the setting of which precise, objective criteria will scarcely be adducible. (Decisions here will certainly have to depend to some extent upon the relations existing between particular source and target languages.)

It seems advisable, at this point, to expressly caution the reader against schematically equating

'simple utterance' with 'simple' (or basic) sentence and

'complex utterance' with 'complex' (or complicated) sentence.

As will soon be shown in the later passages, even the 'simple' or 'elementary' utterance is a semantically complicated structure, the components of which will, in a full representation, have to be strung together in a 'conjoined structure' bearing the outer form of a complex sentence. Where 'simple utterances' appear in the form of 'simple sentences', which is, of course, very possible, this has obviously to be considered as due to secondary 'condensations' (lexical or syntactical, in kind) in the process of the progressive shaping of the mental, semantic structures and their conversion into physically manifest speech units. What is found in actual 'simple sentences' may, in other cases, also be the result of condensations of 'complex utterances'.

4

As concerns the organization or construction of 'language utterances' as basic units of linguistic description, we shall confine ourselves here to some very general remarks only and try to make our representations more explicit, in part at least, in the following exposition.

'Linguistic utterances' in the sense explicated, may be regarded from the aspect of their character as physically actualized, material units, i.e. phenomena of objective reality, and, in their capacity as mental or ideal units, as present in the minds of the speakers of a language and thus having psychological reality. Language units of this sort can obviously be said to consist or be made up of different layers of structure exhibiting a particular 'rule-determined' internal organization and systematically interrelated. It is usual, therefore, to ascribe three structural levels to linguistic utterances: semantic structure, syntactic structure, and 'sound structure' (to be linked somehow

with orthographic structure). (For purposes of description aimed at in our project the latter will be of interest only, or mainly, at any rate, as far as matters of intonation contours of the relevant utterance types are concerned).

It is theoretically possible on each of these levels (or structural layers) of linguistic utterances to distinguish specific functioning units and relations between these units, or, in other words, particular relational patterns ('Relationsgefüge') and categories. These are, apart from 'sound patterns' or 'patterns of intonation' (about which nothing more can be said in the present paper), what may be called

patterns of semantic relations and (relational) categories and their syntactic 'counterparts':

patterns of syntactic relationships and categories.

Any model of grammatical description aiming at descriptive adequacy will, in accordance with the three-levelled organization of linguistic utterances, certainly have to comprise three main levels of representation (or 'components'), namely the semantic level (or content level), the level of syntax (or syntactic level), and the phonological level, which, in themselves, permit further subdivisions. In this connexion we must content ourselves with directing attention to the obvious possibility of distinguishing two sub-levels or components at the content level which we will tentatively call the level of semantic relations and the lexicon (sometimes also called the 'level of lexical representations').

5

Although there can be no doubt of a 'full' description of linguistic utterances having to cover representations of their construction at each of the three major levels mentioned, the crucial question essentially influencing the character (? and adequacy) of the description is evidently the question of the level from which to start in this undertaking.

In view of the apparent limitations of approaches to the study of 'language structure' in the way of descriptive structuralist or 'classical' transformational generative grammar — limitations concerning the theoretical foundations as well as the practical applicability —, further inquiries into the possibilities of a non-syntactically based approach to the phenomena of language seem to us not only legitimate but at the same time highly worth-while and promising.

What we propose, therefore, is to choose the semantic level as the descriptive base and first of all consider the linguistic utterance as a means of transmitting information ('message'), as a 'meaning-bearing unit', not the potential syntactic forms (or 'structures') available in the particular individual languages to express the semantic content under consideration.

The potentiality, inherent in any language, of producing an infinite number of linguistic utterances, admittedly forbids starting descriptions at this

level with full representations of the meaning content of the single individual utterances as occurring in objective reality (and as such absolutely indispensable as source material to the student of language). It is obviously necessary, therefore, to look for a higher level of abstraction as the origin for describing the semantic structure of language utterances.

What we are looking for is, in our opinion, the level of semantic relations from which it seems possible to us to gain access to 'underlying' semantic relational structure which the particular individual utterance in its capacity as a unit of content shares with other utterances of the same type (type of utterance).

The utterance as occurring at this level of description is, in other words, an abstraction from those semantic features and properties which make up its special character as single free, or individual, utterance. It contains only those most general content features characteristic of the whole group of utterances belonging to the same type and representing, so to speak, its 'basic content'. The patterns of this level are, in a certain way, 'communication-oriented' forms of the reflection of reality in mind, not essentially dissimilar from what Rosenthal — Yudin call "forms of the reflection of reality in thought ... which themselves reflect the most general features of reality" (Rosenthal and Yudin (eds.) 1967 : 252ff).

What we are attempting to get at on the level of semantic relations might well be described, too, as 'constructional frames', 'skeleton structure', (also called occasionally 'plans' or 'programmes' of language utterances) or, simply, frames into which particularizing, identifying and other items or details can be fitted, and which, in this way, are convertible into 'simple' concrete individual utterances capable of being conjoined with other 'simple' utterances (of the same or another type) into 'complex' cognitive contents, 'komplexe Bewußtseinsinhalte').

To make this more explicit (expressly restricting ourselves to what we have called 'simple' linguistic utterances), will be the main concern of the rest of this paper. Before doing so, it is not out of place, perhaps, to briefly touch upon questions of the potential impact of such an approach to linguistic description on the teaching of languages (in accordance with the objectives outlined above).

In connexion with further efforts to increase the effectiveness of foreign language teaching with the support of linguistic research, there are three aspects which seem to us to be especially worth mentioning.

(1) An approach to the phenomena of language as suggested above will hopefully provide descriptions which in our opinion, will enable teachers to — free 'grammatical teaching' from one-sided confinement to 'outer' or 'deeper' — syntactic forms and thus make it possible to dismiss 'purely' syntactic patterns without, of necessity, entirely desisting from 'pattern prac-

tice' or employment of 'Leitschemata', 'Modellkonstruktionen', or 'Konstruktionsmuster' in language teaching classes, textbooks, programmes, etc.

'Syntactic patterns', whether of the descriptive structuralist sort and thus "leaving the underlying structure unrevealed" (Bolinger 1968 : 295) or going further back to 'deep structures' to be generated in the syntactic component of 'standard' transformational grammars, have, in spite of more or less far-reaching dissimilarities, obviously one thing in common which inevitably reduces their utility for language teaching purposes: the concrete individual utterances derivable from one and the same pattern or to be formed by using a given framework are, of necessity, highly heterogeneous with regard to their semantic content or organization. What is essential to the learner, at least until he has acquired a relatively good basic command of the foreign language, 'evenly proportioned' or equal concentration on form and content, or morpho-syntactical and lexical matter, to an optimally high degree, is evidently difficult if not impossible, to achieve in pattern practices based on syntactic patterns only.

Therefore maintaining the 'sentence pattern' or 'formal pattern of sentence' unchanged does not, in many cases, at least, relieve the learner of the necessity of 'leaps' in matter of content and of "imagining a whole fresh situation for every utterance while keeping up with the mechanical requirements of the exercise" (Newmark and Reibel 1968 : 238). Especially illustrative examples of this are found in 'classical' behaviourist-oriented pattern drill books in which no attention is paid to any aspects of the 'inner' form of linguistic utterances. Thus, within one and the same lesson, for instance, sentences such as the following are given to be changed according to the example:

- We passed a girl. She was standing on the corner.
 ⇒ We passed a girl standing on the corner.
- | | |
|----------------------------|----------------------------------|
| (1) They spoke to the man. | He was selling shoes. |
| (2) We found the boys. | They were playing baseball. |
| (3) They thought of me. | I was studying in my room. |
| (4) I could feel my heart. | It was beating rapidly. |
| (5) I saw him. | He was going to the movies, etc. |

(Lado and Fries 1965 : 256 ff).

Although the required formal operations ("combin[ing] the statements ... to make a shorter utterance") are undoubtedly the same in all cases, one will certainly look in vain for any systematic connexions with regard to the semantic content of the sentences under consideration. If we are inclined to accept opinions according to which "structural drills, in which the student practices switching quickly from an utterance appropriate for one situation to another utterance appropriate for quite another situation, are ineffective in principle

(Newmark and Reibel 1968 : 238)", we will obviously have to apply the same judgment without any restrictions to 'drills' of the kind just mentioned.

We are not at all against 'pattern practices' and do not in the least doubt their usefulness — or even indispensability — in foreign language teaching. But we believe in the possibility of 'pattern practices' of a new kind, more efficient and theoretically more soundly based than 'classical' 'pattern practice' resting entirely on theoretical principles of behaviourism, the inadequacies of which can scarcely be overlooked any longer. Changes in this as in other respects may very well be brought about by a semantically based approach to a description of the phenomena of language.

What is particular and noteworthy about the 'input material' of the level of semantic relations — the semantic relational structures of linguistic utterances — is the fact that the 'constructional frames' here are not 'purely' semantic in the same way as the patterns of structural descriptions or the 'deep structures' of 'standard' transformational generative grammar are (or are considered to be) 'purely' syntactic. 'Relational patterns' as occurring at the first level of a semantically based description are patterns of semantic (or lexical) as well as of (morpho-) syntactic relevance. It is this very same fact which, in our opinion, will open up entirely new possibilities of 'pattern practice', possibilities of using one and the same 'constructional frame' for a variety of purposes, such as

- the development of control of syntax by concentrating on the (morpho-) syntactic organization of linguistic utterances of the particular type under consideration,
- the step-by-step expansion of syntactic control by enlarging upon potential variations in the syntactic structuring of the relevant utterances,
- the systematic expansion of vocabulary by concentrating on the insertion of appropriate lexical items as well as on the possibilities of 'lexical condensations',
- centering on the intonational patterning of the specific utterance type, etc. or (perhaps to an even greater extent) possibilities of substituting specific components of the relational structure while keeping the others unchanged and proceeding in the same ways just described or in others which cannot be gone into at this point.

(2) What we have already hinted at in the preceding passage, but what seems to us to be worth pointing out more clearly, is the apparent possibility — opened up by a semantically based approach — of overcoming the usually sharp division between 'grammatical teaching' or teaching (exercises, etc.) designed for the 'acquisition of grammatical knowledge' and 'development of the productive control of syntax' on the one hand, and the 'teaching or expansion of vocabulary', on the other, which is so characteristic of much language teaching as it is practised today.

Conscious and purposeful consideration of criteria of 'semantic as well as of syntactic relevance' in the composition of 'texts' to be used in a systematically arranged language teaching course must, obviously, be considered another means of increasing the effectiveness of foreign language teaching. Proceeding in this way will, at the same time, enable us to establish closer conformity to 'linguistic reality' in which 'vocabulary' and 'grammar', "das Lexikalische und das Grammatische" (Wissemann 1961 : 5), do not exist in isolation from each other but in a relation of "gegenseitiger Durchdringung" ('mutual penetration') and constitute, as H. Wissemann puts it, "in einer innigen Funktionsgemeinschaft ... miteinander den Sinn des Satzes" (Wissemann 1961 : 1).

It is for this reason, too, that we prefer to use 'grammar' as the more comprehensive term under which lexico-semantic as well as morpho-syntactic and phonological phenomena may be subsumed. Opinions, according to which 'grammar' plays a subordinate role in FLT — the main concern of which is to be considered the teaching of knowledge of, and the development of skills in the use of, foreign language vocabulary, — clearly betray an unacceptably narrow view of what constitutes 'grammar' and entirely fail to grasp the systematic interrelatedness of the phenomena of language.

What is ignored by adherents of this view is, amongst other things, the fact that, given a definite number of lexical elements to assign to or string together into a single utterance (as, for example, *boy, book, girl, give*, additionally marked, perhaps, as $\langle \pm \text{definite} \rangle$), what is actually given is more than the simply lexical. The 'independent' 'meaning-bearing' constituents of the utterance(s) to be formed out of them cannot properly be said to be mere 'bearers' of so-called 'lexical meaning' or 'semantic meaning' or, in other words, representations of mental pictures of elements of state of affairs which as such have nothing to do with what is traditionally called 'grammatical meaning'. In reality, they do, in fact, also contain 'syntactically relevant information'.

In this sense, one can certainly agree with H. Wissemann who expresses the opinion that 'it is very possible' "vom Bestande der lexikalischen Zeichen eines Satzes aus weite Bereiche des Grammatischen zu ergänzen und somit seinen Sinn zwar nicht eindeutig aber doch in wechselndem Grade der Annäherung an das Gemeinte zu erfassen", that the "Ergänzbarkeit des Grammatischen vom Lexikalischen aus", however, "... nicht das Grammatische in seiner Gesamtheit, sondern nur einen Teil des Grammatischen ... betrifft" (Wisseman 1961 : 4 - 5).

It should be clear to everybody that as soon as the isolated items *boy, book, girl, give* are selected from the lexicon of English, for instance, to be treated as constituents of one and the same linguistic utterance, the number of states of affairs to be reflected in and expressed by utterances containing these

four elements is definitely limited and the possibility of combining these 'words' is clearly restricted in accordance with the mutual relations which can be entered into by the elements of the states of affairs referred to by the lexical items under consideration. Thus, the inherent 'combination restrictions' clearly confine 'acceptability' to (5) (i) and (ii) of the following structures and block combinations as those illustrated in (5) (iii) to (5) (vi)

- (5) (i) a boy give — $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{a book to a girl} \\ \text{a girl a book} \end{array} \right\}$
 (ii) a girl give — $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{a book to a boy} \\ \text{a boy a book} \end{array} \right\}$
 (iii) a girl give a boy to a book
 (iv) a boy give — a girl to a book
 (v) a book give — a boy to a girl
 (vi) a book give — a girl to a boy

Consistently taking account of connexions or interrelationships such as these and systematically utilizing them for language teaching purposes will certainly be greatly facilitated by descriptions of the kind advocated in this paper.

(3) Approaching the description of linguistic phenomena from a semantic base will, in our opinion, not only give the learner an insight generally into domains beyond 'pure' outer syntactic form which are closed to him in the mechanical drills of behaviourist-oriented pattern practice, but we are convinced, it will also put him in a position of even going beyond the 'deep structures' of classical transformational generative grammar and of mentally penetrating more deeply into the phenomena of the language to be learned and their interrelations. It will permit not only 'insight into the syntactic structure' but 'intellectual understanding' in the more comprehensive sense of 'mentally grasping' the things to be learned as the only, or, at least, the best way to 'commanding' or 'controlling' them, without in any way demanding a return to the 'grammaticizing way' of language teaching or negating, in the slightest that "understanding and performance are inseparable" (Bolinger 1968 : 298).

B

The main concern of the following chapter will be to give a first, tentative, survey of the components of the organization of the 'simple' linguistic utterance (in its capacity as 'basic unit' of language description) at the level of semantic relations. We are fully aware of the lack of uniformity and the differences in the degree of abstractness and detailedness of the representation — unfortunately inevitable at the present

stage of research — and have no doubt that a number of the assumptions we shall make here will have to be made more precise, to be modified or wholly abandoned in the course of further advances in our state of knowledge, and that greater adequacy of the description requires a higher degree of formalization than that to be achieved in the present paper.

We should also like to point out, from the very beginning, that the following analyses of 'simple linguistic utterances' are restricted to 'direct' utterances (as opposed to reports of somebody else's statements, etc.).

1

In representing the underlying semantic relational structure of 'simple linguistic utterances', which, in our opinion, can be described as language invariant or, at least, not bound to any particular individual languages, it seems possible — and legitimate for descriptive purposes — to distinguish a number of major components which themselves can be further divided into sub-components. As far as we can see at present, analyses of the semantic 'make-up' of linguistic utterances will have to take into consideration such kinds of 'content elements' as we here propose to subsume under four main components or constituents of their underlying relational structure, which we will, for lack of more adequate terms, very provisionally call

Propositional Frame,
 Reference Frame,
 Speaker Attitude and
 Communication Situation.

By 'propositional frame' we here understand that part of the relational pattern of the linguistic utterance in its capacity as a unit of content which serves the reflection of states of affairs or, more precisely, perhaps, the 'projection' of — 'direct' or 'indirect' — mental pictures of specific sections of the primary material or social reality (as far as subsumable under the notion of 'state of affairs') and which is sometimes also called the 'logico-semantic component'.

Similarly we might say that the component under consideration serves the 'input' of 'cognitive content'. We thus distinguish, in accordance with the authors of 'Obščee Jazykoznanie', the "cognitive content as one of the obligatory components of linguistic meaning". (Obščee jazykoznanie 1970 : 400; translated from Russian) 'Cognitive content' is to us in this connexion a certain product of the cognitive activity or mental apprehension of man, either in the sense of 'direct' mental apprehension or reflection by the speaker himself or in the sense of a 'mediated' product of the cognitive or mental activity of other people.

In order to prevent misunderstandings it is helpful, perhaps, to point out that from the potential set of states of affairs to be reflected in the mind of the speaker we have expressly excluded linguistic utterances themselves in their capacity as 'messages' or physically manifest phenomena of objective reality as 'receivable' by a listener, for example. The 'images' of states of affairs to be 'shaped' within the 'propositional frame' are propositions as mental pictures of non-verbal actual, past, or possible (thinkable) — material or ideal — states of affairs.

Ideally, the mental picture to be dealt with in this part of the underlying relational structure of the 'simple linguistic utterance' should be that of a so-called 'simple' or 'elementary' state of affairs (as opposed to a 'complicated' or 'complex' state of affairs made up itself of two or more 'simple' states of affairs), that is, logically speaking, a 'simple' or 'elementary proposition' potentially expansible into a 'complex proposition'.

As far as this is concerned, however, we are still facing many unsolved problems, last not least from the aspect of the utility of our description for practical teaching purposes. Irena Bellert may very well be right here in her opinion according to which "an 'elementary' or 'simple' proposition is, in fact, simple only with respect to its logical predicate. Its arguments, however, may be quite complex" (Bellert 1969 : 38).

The relations in this part of the underlying relational structure of linguistic utterances designed to form a frame for the apprehended or conceived objective content, also called occasionally 'logical', 'cognitive' or 'semantic relations' are, in fact, reflections of "objektive Beziehungen zwischen den Gegenständen und Erscheinungen, z.B. Beziehungen des Objekts und des Merkmals, räumliche, quantitative, kausal-konsekutive u.a. Beziehungen" (Obščee jazykoznanie 1970 : 404 ff), reflections of relations as existing between objects, properties, etc. (or, in the case of 'complex' propositions, between states of affairs) in objective reality or 'ideal' relations occurring between the constituents of mental constructions, for instance.

It is this which distinguishes semantic relations as 'cognitive relations' in an important way from syntactic or, as they are frequently called, 'grammatical' relations (or, at least, part of them) with reference to which Ch. C. Fries rightfully claims that "the actual relation of things in the real situation does not determine the grammatical relations of the words expressing these things in a ... sentence" (Fries 1952 : 177).

2

Not unlike earlier studies in this field we advocate a further decomposition of this component of the underlying relational pattern of linguistic utterances, i.e. their 'propositional frame', into two substructures, the propositional

nucleus on core, or, simply 'nucleus', and — the remaining part of the 'propositional frame' for which, for the time being, we have no better term to offer than just 'extra-nuclear component'.

Of these two it is, undoubtedly, the 'propositional nucleus' on which the larger part of attention of earlier and contemporary 'semantically-oriented' studies has been centered and about the structure of which the 'clearest' ideas can be said to exist.




The 'nucleus' as a relational structure within the larger relational structure of the utterance as a whole, not including 'time' or 'modality', can, very generally, be said to consist of two or more 'propositional terms' unequivocally characterized with regard to the relations existing between them and 'free' or 'unbound' as far as their order at this level of description is concerned. The constituents forming the 'nucleus' which serves the reflection of essential features of the relevant type of states of affairs are, speaking somewhat more precisely, the relational notion proper, truly 'simple' or 'elementary' in character and called 'predicate' or 'predicate term' in logic, and the relational constituents ('arguments' in logic) going with it. All of them together form a particular — semantic — construction within which each constituent has its specific place, semantic function or role, or exists in specific [sense] relations to the other constituents.

The particular notions serving as constituents of such propositional structures do not yet represent the 'full' mental images of the individual components of actual states of affairs. The relations between these notions or 'concepts', the 'conceptual relations', as mental images of the relations occurring between the (nuclear) elements of material or ideal states of affairs, cover but one component of the conceptual pictures of these elements. What is important, is that what we have here is exactly the syntactically relevant part of their conceptual content.

What makes up the 'propositional nucleus', then, is apart from the predicate term, 'meaning units' in specific 'semantic functions' or 'roles' representing 'the parts that the various persons, objects, or other phenomena may play in the particular states of affairs under consideration'.

As the available space precludes detailed descriptions, nothing like an 'exhaustive' characterization of the structures representable under the 'propositional nucleus' can be aimed at in the present paper. It is hoped, however, that the following tentative representations of a group of related patterns will serve to give a very rough impression, at least, of what may be covered of the semantic structure of linguistic utterances in this particular subcomponent.

Concrete individual utterances which, as far as their 'propositional' component is concerned, can be said to have underlying relational structures of this sort (but have undergone different kinds of changes and lexicalizations or



lexical condensations in the process of their conversion into physically manifest speech units), such as

- (6) At Easter hundreds of people march from London to Aldermaston
 - (7) John intends to drive down from Edinburgh to London in his (own) car
 - (8) The American returned to his hotel from the airport
 - (9) Space-shuttles will soon be carrying passengers to and from space stations
 - (10) The political prisoners were flown from Brazil to Mexico
 - (11) He flew from Europe to Tokyo by the route across the Pole
- are all to be assigned to structure (1), or, as in the following cases, belong to the second structure,
- (12) The boy fell down from the apple-tree onto the ground
 - (13) He was drifting out [from San Francisco Bay] through the Golden Gate into the Pacific Ocean,
- or, are assignable to structure (3)
- (14) The {released political prisoners are in Mexico} now
 {American is in his hotel}
 - (15) The boy lies on the ground.

Before leaving the 'propositional nucleus', we should like to draw attention to the following fact: As what we are concerned with is not states of affairs themselves but reflections of them in the mind of a speaker, it seems to us that structures as represented here will require further 'processing' before being fully suited as 'input' material to the lexicon and the syntactic component. What we mean is that, in order to describe the degree in 'completeness' of the picture of the relevant state of affairs as it exists in the mind of a particular individual speaker, possibilities of further specifications of the relational constituents (ultimately, requirements for 'embeddings') will have to be taken into consideration in the elaboration of the model of description.

Such specifications, whether optimally to be given in the form of 'feature indices' (as here) or in any other way, will probably have to include the following:

- <±particularized>: not predicted of all elements of a class or, in the case of <-particularized> (which, combined with <+identified>, gives <+generalized>), applied to the whole class, e.g. LOCATION
- <±singularized>: (applicable in the case of countables only) (not) related to one member of a particular class, species or group, e.g. a single LOCATION
- <±quantified>: (excluded in the case of <+singularized>), definitely or indefinitely limited with regard to number, amount size or extent in space or time

- <±qualified>: modified with reference to quality, condition, etc., or, as in the case of 'location in space or time', further specified with regard to its 'position', e.g. ON THE EARTH, IN EUROPE, IN ENGLAND
- <±sub-classified>: assigned to a particular sub-class or sub-group of the class under consideration, e.g. TOWN
- <±identified>: made unique, identified as a separate entity, or restricted to an individual person, animal, town, ship or any other object, e.g. LONDON

In real states of affairs the features mentioned are, of course, existent and thus positive in value. Elements negatively specified in the reflections of these states of affairs in the mind of individual speakers are, therefore, potential 'questioned elements' in the formulation of questions.


3

Full characterizations of what makes up the second sub-component of the Propositional Frame, the one that we have called the Extra — Nuclear Component, are difficult to achieve at the present stage of research. As is evident from the construction of simple linguistic utterances such as

(16) I *finished* reading that book *at work yesterday at eleven o'clock*, there remain a number of elements (those in italic type) not to be covered in the Propositional Nucleus. What we are especially made aware of by examples of the kind just quoted, perhaps, is the fundamental fact that everything occurs in a spatio-temporal situation. It seems highly plausible to us, indeed, that it is objective phenomena relating to this spatio-temporal situation in particular that have to be taken account of in the Extra-Nuclear Component of the Propositional Frame.


However, we do not feel in a position, at present to say anything substantial about how to handle the location in space of states of affairs in the suggested model of description and, therefore, have to content ourselves with simply pointing to the obvious necessity of including this in a fully adequate description of the semantic structure of linguistic utterances. A somewhat more explicit representation can be given, however, of what in our opinion has to be considered another main constituent of the Extra-Nuclear Component — the Time constituent. This obviously consists of two subconstituents relating to location and distribution in time of the states of affairs under consideration.

What has been distinguished until now of the underlying semantic relational structure of simple linguistic utterances can be graphically represented in the following way:



Of the two time-sub-constituents, the first (i.e. Sit) evidently has to serve the 'input' of 'concrete' details referring, more or less definitely, depending on the state of the speaker's knowledge, to position (location or situation) and — if not clocked by the character of its temporal contour — extension or continuance (duration) in time of the particular action, event, process, or state reflected in the mind.

Without, in any way, claiming 'exhaustiveness' and finally of the representation, the time-situation component might be said potentially to contain elements such as




Each of the relevant constituents may then, in the same way as the relational constituents of the Nucleus, be additionally marked with respect to features such as those given on p. 23f., in order to characterize more fully the 'preciseness' of their reflections in the individual speaker's mind.



The function of the second time-related sub-constituent (i.e. Cont) within the Propositional Frame is to specify somehow "the temporal dimension ... associated with the [particular] action [process or state]"⁴, or to establish the "Verhältnis ... der Handlung zum Zeitverlauf" (Ammers 1958: 207) or, as it is occasionally put, to reflect 'the quality' of the action or state as regards 'momentariness' or 'durativeness', 'completeness' or 'incompleteness', for instance.

Without attempting to submit any definite suggestion as to the exact structuring of the temporal-contour component, the features specifiable in this part of the semantic relational structure, may with some justification, perhaps, be said to include such as given in the following survey:

⁴ Ridjanović 1972: 119. We gratefully acknowledge the stimulating effect exercised on the present representation by this paper in particular.



Further subdivision proves necessary in the case of the first group of temporal contours, at least. The following distinctions may tentatively be made:



Only a few examples will have to suffice here to illustrate what is to be understood by the various temporal contours mentioned in the preceding survey:

- (17) John set out (started) on his way from Edinburgh to London by car (bicycle) at ten o'clock on May 20, 1972 ('inceptive')
- (18) John completed (ended) his trip from Edinburgh to London by car at 8 p.m. on May 20, 1972 —
John arrived in London by car at 8 p.m. on May 20, 1972 ('terminative')
- (19) John broke off, stopped, speaking in the middle of a sentence ('cessative')

- (20) John spent six months in London —
John stayed in London from the end of May until the beginning of July ('extensive')
- (21) John covered the distance (route) from Edinburgh to London by car in ten hours ('completive')
- (22) John covered the final part of his trip from Edinburgh to London by car in two hours ('finitive')
- (23) John is setting out on his way from Edinburgh to London by car ('inchoative')
- (24) John is (now) on his way from Edinburgh to London by car.
John is driving from Edinburgh to London ('progressive gen')
- (25) John is still on the (his) way from Edinburgh to London by car.
John is still driving from Edinburgh to London ('continuative')
- (26) John is covering the final part of his trip from Edinburgh to London by car.
John is approaching London by car ('conclusive')
- (27) London is situated on the banks of the Thames ('permanent')
- (28) I know English ('non-permanent')
- (29) John has (just) arrived in London by car ('perfective')
- (30) John has (just)

{	finished	painting the doors
		washing the shirt
		cleaning the house
		reading/writing the book
completed(writing) the manuscript ('perfective')		
- (31) John usually (always) goes from Edinburgh to London by car ('iterative').

Descriptions of the (semantic) construction of 'language utterances' as 'messages' or 'means of linguistic communicative activity', can definitely not be restricted to the 'cognitive content' or 'mental image proper' of the particular state of affairs, which forms the 'input' to the 'Propositional Frame'. For the 'proposition' in its 'pure' form obviously is an abstraction which, although isolated here for descriptive purposes, does not exist as such in the mind of the reflecting individual.

What is present in the subject's mind is neither an image existing in complete isolation from other cognitive contents nor something purely 'objective' in character but something which is affected somehow by the individual's (intellectual, volitional, or emotional) involvement or commitment to the object of reflection. The character of the reflection, in other words, depends upon the 'inner state' or 'consciousness' of the reflecting subject, his concern with or attitude towards the particular state of affairs in question. In recognizing the subjective element in the mental reflections of the individual one will, on the other hand, however, have to pay equal consideration to the fact of its

inseparability from the objective relations existing between the individual and his social environment.

The idea that there are two sides, "zwei wesentliche Funktionen" "die objektive Seite" and "ein ... subjective[r] Aspekt" (Klaus 1969: 117), of the thought to be taken account of, is reflected also in opinions of 'traditional' grammarians such as G. O. Curme, for instance, according to whom "the sentence has two functions: ... it makes a statement, or, in the case of a question, calls for a statement, ... and it is an expression of emotions, attitudes, intentions, and moods present in the speaker..." (Curme 1931: 1).

Before going into the consequences resulting from these facts for descriptions of the organization of linguistic utterances on the content level, or, more precisely, on the level of semantic relations, we should like to draw attention to particular implications of the assumption that propositions (in the sense of mental pictures of states of affairs) have no 'independent' existence but are always, somehow or other, 'penetrated' by the speaker's attitude with reference to the state of affairs reflected and thus made into 'judgements'. What we have in mind here is the fact that "das Urteil immer im menschlichen Bewußtsein existiert und daß es damit stets auch zu anderen Bewußtseinsinhalten in Beziehung gesetzt wird" (Philosophisches Wörterbuch 1971:1109).

It goes beyond the scope of the present paper to do full justice to the obvious intricacy of the structural design of linguistic utterances on the level of content. The following exposition can, therefore, not be claimed to be more than an 'enumeration' of elements to be taken into account in fuller elaborations of the model of description (which will be the subject of another paper now in preparation). Although some suggestions in this direction could be made, we shall refrain here from any attempts to give a formalized representation.

5

In further completing our picture of the underlying semantic relational structure of utterances, we here suggest the addition of the 'Reference Frame' as another main component.

We consider the function of this component to be that of serving the speaker for reference in his formation of judgments concerning the states of affairs reflected in his mind, or, in other words, providing the basis of judgment. What is to be covered within the Frame of Reference are, in our opinion, properties of either mental images or states of affairs (in their capacity as objects of mental reflection) to which the individual may refer in his judgement, but which have existence independently of him. This latter fact will have to be borne in mind in order to prevent confusion with other features of judgements which are clearly dependent on the subject.

Properties of the sort in question, which belong, at least in part, to the cate-

gory of 'relative' (as opposed to 'absolute') properties, may be said to include such as the following:

- (1) (degree of) agreement (or non-agreement) of the mental picture or the matter of fact to be reflected in the mind, respectively, with certain 'values', 'standards' or 'norms', such as
- the adequacy of the reflection itself, the (degree of) accordance of the image with the actual state of affairs, the evidence, with fact or reality (i.e. the truth-value of the proposition),
 - the 'naturalness', 'reasonableness', 'soundness', 'correctness', 'lawfulness' etc. of the matter of fact under consideration,
 - the conformity (or non-conformity) of a particular course of action or other state of affairs with certain norms of behaviour, ethical or moral principles as valid in a certain society or for particular social classes or groups, with the desires of society, political principles, ideologies, and many other properties or relations of the same category, verbally representable in a very general form as

Δ be (Deg) in $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{accordance} \\ \text{agreement} \\ \text{conformity} \end{array} \right\}$ with Y

- (2) objective potentiality, probability, unavoidability or inevitability (such as the quality of following immediately from physical, social, moral or logical laws, for example) of the coming into being or activity of something, roughly verbalizable, perhaps as

it be (Deg) $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{possible} \\ \text{probable} \\ \text{inevitable} \end{array} \right\}$ that:

Δ $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{come to be} \\ \text{become} \\ \text{come into actual existence} \end{array} \right\}$ $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{reality} \\ \text{an actual fact} \end{array} \right\}$ at some future time (or generally)

- (3) (degree of) necessity or requisiteness of a certain act, process or event for something else:

Δ be $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{(something that is) necessary (to a specific end)} \\ \text{required as a condition for} \\ \text{a prerequisite of} \\ \text{vital / essential / requisite to / for} \end{array} \right\}$ Y

- (4) (degree of) significance, utility, etc. for something else, verbally representable as:


Δ be $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{much} \\ \text{great} \\ \text{little} \\ \text{no} \\ \text{little} \end{array} \right\} \\ \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{very} \\ \text{highly} \\ \vdots \end{array} \right\} \end{array} \right\}$ of $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{importance} \\ \text{significance} \\ \text{value} \\ \text{consequence} \\ \text{use} \end{array} \right\} \\ \left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{useful} \\ \text{advantageous} \\ \text{profitable} \\ \vdots \end{array} \right\} \end{array} \right\}$ to/for Y

There is no doubt that the 'list' of potential 'objects of judgement' will have to be further extended and that fuller representations will also have to take account of 'value — relations' not referring to the 'proposition' as a whole but to certain of its components, i.e. relating, amongst other things, to the personality or character of people, motives and goals of actions, properties of objects, aesthetic qualities, and many others.

6

What will scarcely raise any objections is the necessity of complementing the underlying semantic relational structure of linguistic utterances by a component serving the 'projection' of those elements which particularly concern the relations of the speaker to the reflected state of affairs itself or his attitude with reference to specific properties of it, i.e. properties of the sort mentioned in the preceding paragraph. For lack of a better term we will, provisionally, call this component (the component expressive of the) 'Speaker Attitude'; if not the 'Attitudinal Frame'.

For convenience of the description, it seems justifiable to split up this component into two sub-components, according to the specific character of the attitude to be assumed, and to further differentiate the elements to be covered in them. Graphically, this might be represented in the following way:



Attention has to be drawn to the fact, however, that the two subcomponents of the 'Attitudinal Frame' are, at least as far as we can see, not to be conceived of as 'co-occurring components' (with the exception of some specific cases), but to be made use of optionally in the formation of a particular individual utterance.

The first sub-component (represented as Int) may be said to be reserved for the expression of a state of mind or mental attitude arrived at as a result of reasoning or reflection, for the speaker's way of thinking about or viewing certain things intellectually, whereas the second might be set aside for the 'input' of elements more closely connected with the state of feeling, the speaker's emotional attitude towards certain facts or imagined states of affairs, his way of viewing certain things (more) emotionally.

Although we cannot go into details here, it must at least be mentioned that the elements of the speaker's attitude to be specified within the 'Attitudinal Frame' do not at all necessarily require explicit formulation in the 'actualization' of the particular individual utterance. Instead of explicitly stating his attitude, the speaker may, in many cases, decide upon other ways of indicating his evaluation of or emotional involvement in a particular matter.

Besides intonation as a highly flexible means of expressing subtler shades of attitudes, there is the lexicon itself which offers him opportunities for pointing to his attitude simply by his choice of one of several possible lexical items basically identical in reference but differing in 'connotation' or 'tinge', 'neutral' or 'non-neutral'.

The particular elements to be covered in the 'intellectual attitude' component have been named 'Evaluational' and 'Volitional'. The first of them, the one (perhaps the only one) which seems to us to require at least 'minimum specification' in the formulation of all utterances whatsoever, may be said to serve 'evaluation proper' or 'judgement' in the narrower sense of the word, that is expression of the mental attitude of the speaker assumed with reference to the actuality, potentiality, probability, certainty, or unavailability of the state of affairs reflected in the mind or its conformity with certain standards, norms, principles or regulations, or its significance, necessity, usefulness for something else, etc.

In any case the 'evaluational' sub-component includes elements referring to either unqualified (tacit) approval or denial, or to varying degrees ranging from 'absolute' certainty to almost complete uncertainty about the object of judgment, or to emphatic assertion or denial. It does, of course, also include other elements which cannot be gone into at this point.

A somewhat different mental attitude, called Volitional and assumed as a result of deliberation or examination, may be said to relate to a future state of affairs in the sense of an 'envisaged goal', a situation to be reached by — more or less — planned measures or concerted action. It is existent in the

speaker in the form of a plan, will, intention, purpose, or design and finds expression in linguistic utterances such as

(32) John had no intention of going from Edinburgh to London by car — John had no intention of driving from Edinburgh to London.

(33) We are determined to reach a political solution of the Indochina problem.

The elements to be covered in the 'emotional — attitude component' obviously include emotional reaction or response to or evaluation of something seen, heard, or otherwise experienced, on the one hand, and, on the other, inclination towards the reaching of a certain goal arising from one's own inner condition, disposition, feeling or need, that is desire, want, wish, longing, craving, need or urge, for instance, subsumed as 'Optative' in the graphic representation. Concrete individual utterances containing elements of this kind are, for example,

(34) I should very much like to drive down from Edinburgh to London.

(35) I am indignant at (view with dismay) the fact that US. helicopters have flown more Saigon regime troops from South Vietnam to Cambodia.

7

Time and space permit only a few remarks on the possibilities of a still more complete description of the underlying relational structure of linguistic utterances at the content level by the addition of another component, provisionally called the 'Situational Frame'. This component will enable us to take into consideration the relevant features which concern the particular communication situation with the inclusion of facts regarding the attitude of the speaker to his interlocutor.

Apart from the main constituents, verbally to be represented as

X (the speaker, I) $\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \text{inform-} \\ \text{tell} \end{array} \right\}$ Y (the one to whom the speaker addresses himself):

and the Location in Time of the utterance (which in 'direct statements' always has to be considered as NOW), it permits account to be taken of further features influencing the way of formulating the utterance and determining, in part, also the attitude of the speaker with regard to the particular state of affairs reflected in his mind.

Among the features relevant — especially in relation to the 'socially determined aspects of speech' — which could perhaps be represented in the form of indices to the relational constituents of this component, such elements may be mentioned as the speaker's social standing, his membership of a social class or social group, his educational level, the character of the relationship between the speaker and the person(s) to whom the speaker addresses himself, with the inclusion of differences in status between them, etc.

What is equally possible is to take account of the emotional reactions to the behaviour of his partner(s) resulting immediately from the particular situation and indicated, frequently, in 'emotional overtones' by means of intonational variation.

C

The topic of the present paper necessarily demanded concentration on questions of the semantic organization of linguistic utterances at the uppermost level of abstraction to be taken account of in the suggested model of description, the level of semantic relations. Restriction to this seemed to us the more justifiable as what is to be covered at this level may hopefully be regarded as invariant from language to language and, therefore, is suited not only as the initial level of the description of particular individual languages, but equally well as the base from which profitably to set in Contrastive Structure Studies. For it will scarcely be subject to doubt that "discovering how language-invariant concepts and propositions... are ultimately realized or expressed in language specific forms or structures in the two languages under comparison" (Berndt 1971: 29) must be considered one of the main objectives of contrastive linguistics.

'Language-specificness' does, in our opinion, begin to come in in what we have distinguished as the *Lexicon* or lexical subcomponent within the semantic level, more precisely, in the formation of individual utterances to be fitted into specific 'utterance-frames' (or 'semantic relational' structures) It is these processes concerning the generation of concrete individual utterances of particular types from the underlying relational structures established at the level of semantic relations which are certainly of especial concern to contrastive studies.

To go into the language-specific principles regulating these very processes would, however, go far beyond the scope of this paper, if not beyond the state of knowledge at the present stage of research. What might justifiably be expected in conclusion, would, perhaps, be to present at least some ideas concerning the functions of the other levels or sub-levels of grammatical description as conceived of in the present model.

The most important function of the *LEXICON*, apart from supplying the list of the elementary meaning-bearing units of the particular language in question (not restricted, however, to elements serving the expression of so-called lexical or semantic meaning as opposed to 'grammatical meaning'), obviously is to provide the 'principles' (or lexicon rules) regulating the selection and insertion of the appropriate individual lexical items into the particular positions within the 'utterance-frame', on the one hand, and, on the other, specifying the various possibilities of lexical condensations (as "move through

air by means of..." ⇒ "fly", for example) given in the language under consideration.

The rule mechanism of the *SYNTACTIC LEVEL*, no doubt, will have to consist of sets of principles (syntactic rules) regulating the syntactic patterning or fitting into syntactic patterns of the constructs derived on the semantic level. Amongst these there will have to be rules which establish the relations of the units of meaning or semantic relational constituents (such as Agentive, Patient, Instrumental, etc.) to the syntactical functioning units — or, in other words, rules which make the constituents of semantic relational structures into units of particular syntactic constructions (and, as such, holder of syntactic 'roles') — or specify the ways in which the semantic units are to be given syntactic function and 'formally' marked as means of expressing 'grammatical' relations, such as 'subject-of a sentence', 'predicate-of a sentence', 'direct object', 'indirect object', etc.

Other rules of the sort to be found on the syntactic level will either have to be principles regulating the arrangement or order of the constituents of the particular syntactic relational structures as means of expressing syntactic relationships, or deletion rules specifying potential erasures of elements and relations, principles governing the conjoining of the various components of the linguistic utterance (as distinguished in this paper) into a connected whole, rules concerning reductions of syntactic structures to more compact forms or, in other words, syntactical condensations, as well as principles regulating the joining together of two or more simple utterances, or parts of them, into a complex utterance, etc.

Finally, it is obvious that the rules or principles occurring on the *PHONOLOGICAL LEVEL* will have to regulate the sound structure and intonational patterning of the linguistic utterances.

There is, no doubt, much further ground to be covered and the support of many linguists is needed in order to solve a host of open questions concerning the 'miracle of language', from the point of view of linguistics proper as well as that of applied linguistics.

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